

East TO EAST FOOTHILL EAST BLVD. - SMV STATION

West TO RAYMOND AVENUE - OLD PASADENA

MONDAY THROUGH FRIDAY SCHEDULE

Green & Arroyo Pkwy	Walnut & Garfield	Villa & Lake	Allen & Orange Grove	SMV Station	SMV Station	Allen & Orange Grove	Villa & Lake	Walnut & Garfield	Raymond & Holly	Green & Arroyo Pkwy
A	C	D	E	F	F	E	D	C	B	A
6:00 A	6:03 A	6:08 A	6:15 A	6:24 A	6:34 A	6:46 A	6:50 A	6:55 A	6:56 A	6:59 A
6:23 A	6:26 A	6:31 A	6:38 A	6:47 A	6:57 A	7:08 A	7:13 A	7:18 A	7:20 A	7:23 A
6:49 A	6:52 A	6:57 A	7:05 A	7:15 A	7:25 A	7:36 A	7:41 A	7:46 A	7:48 A	7:51 A
7:03 A	7:06 A	7:12 A	7:20 A	7:30 A	7:40 A	7:51 A	7:56 A	8:01 A	8:03 A	8:06 A
7:28 A	7:31 A	7:37 A	7:45 A	7:55 A	8:14 A	8:25 A	8:30 A	8:35 A	8:37 A	8:40 A
7:54 A	7:57 A	8:03 A	8:10 A	8:20 A	8:30 A	8:41 A	8:46 A	8:51 A	8:53 A	8:56 A <small>Drop Off Only</small>
8:09 A	8:12 A	8:18 A	8:25 A	8:35 A	8:45 A	8:56 A	9:01 A	9:06 A	9:08 A	9:11 A
8:43 A	8:46 A	8:52 A	8:59 A	9:09 A	9:19 A	9:30 A	9:35 A	9:40 A	9:42 A	9:45 A
9:14 A	9:17 A	9:23 A	9:30 A	9:40 A	9:50 A	10:02 A	10:07 A	10:12 A	10:14 A	10:17 A
9:48 A	9:51 A	9:57 A	10:04 A	10:14 A	10:24 A	10:36 A	10:41 A	10:46 A	10:48 A	10:51 A
10:20 A	10:23 A	10:28 A	10:35 A	10:45 A	10:55 A	11:08 A	11:13 A	11:18 A	11:20 A	11:23 A
10:54 A	10:57 A	11:03 A	11:09 A	11:19 A	11:29 A	11:42 A	11:47 A	11:52 A	11:54 A	11:57 A
11:26 A	11:29 A	11:35 A	11:41 A	11:51 A	12:01 P	12:14 P	12:19 P	12:24 P	12:26 P	12:29 P
12:00 P	12:03 P	12:09 P	12:15 P	12:25 P	12:35 P	12:48 P	12:53 P	12:58 P	1:00 P	1:03 P
12:31 P	12:34 P	12:40 P	12:46 P	12:57 P	1:07 P	1:20 P	1:25 P	1:30 P	1:32 P	1:35 P
1:05 P	1:08 P	1:13 P	1:20 P	1:31 P	1:41 P	1:54 P	1:59 P	2:04 P	2:06 P	2:09 P
1:38 P	1:41 P	1:46 P	1:53 P	2:03 P	2:13 P	2:26 P	2:31 P	2:36 P	2:38 P	2:41 P
2:11 P	2:14 P	2:19 P	2:26 P	2:36 P	2:46 P	3:00 P	3:05 P	3:11 P	3:13 P	3:16 P
2:43 P	2:46 P	2:51 P	2:58 P	3:09 P	3:10 P	3:24 P	3:29 P	3:35 P	3:37 P	3:40 P
3:16 P	3:19 P	3:25 P	3:32 P	3:43 P	3:26 P	3:40 P	3:45 P	3:51 P	3:53 P	3:56 P
3:46 P	3:49 P	3:55 P	4:02 P	4:12 P	3:58 P	4:12 P	4:17 P	4:23 P	4:25 P	4:28 P
4:02 P	4:05 P	4:11 P	4:18 P	4:28 P	4:25 P	4:39 P	4:44 P	4:50 P	4:52 P	4:55 P
4:31 P	4:34 P	4:40 P	4:47 P	4:57 P	4:45 P	4:59 P	5:04 P	5:10 P	5:12 P	5:15 P
5:01 P	5:04 P	5:10 P	5:17 P	5:27 P	5:11 P	5:26 P	5:31 P	5:37 P	5:39 P	5:42 P
5:18 P	5:21 P	5:27 P	5:34 P	5:44 P	5:37 P	5:52 P	5:57 P	6:03 P	6:05 P	6:08 P <small>Drop Off Only</small>
5:52 P	5:55 P	6:01 P	6:08 P	6:18 P	5:59 P	6:13 P	6:18 P	6:23 P	6:25 P	6:28 P
6:28 P	6:31 P	6:36 P	6:42 P	6:52 P	6:30 P	6:44 P	6:49 P	6:54 P	6:56 P	6:59 P
6:59 P	7:02 P	7:07 P	7:13 P	7:22 P	7:00 P	7:12 P	7:16 P	7:21 P	7:23 P	7:26 P
7:30 P	7:33 P	7:38 P	7:44 P	7:53 P <small>Drop Off Only</small>	7:32 P	7:44 P	7:48 P	7:53 P	7:55 P	7:58 P <small>Drop Off Only</small>

East TO EAST FOOTHILL EAST BLVD. - SMV STATION

West TO RAYMOND AVENUE - OLD PASADENA

East TO EAST FOOTHILL EAST BLVD. - SMV STATION

West TO RAYMOND AVENUE - OLD PASADENA

SATURDAY SCHEDULE

Green & Arroyo Pkwy	Walnut & Garfield	Villa & Lake	Allen & Orange Grove	SMV Station	SMV Station	Allen & Orange Grove	Villa & Lake	Walnut & Garfield	Raymond & Holly	Green & Arroyo Pkwy
A	B	C	D	E	F	E	D	C	B	A
10:57 A	11:00 A	11:06 A	11:12 A	11:22 A	11:00 A	11:11 A	11:16 A	11:21 A	11:23 A	11:26 A
11:30 A	11:33 A	11:39 A	11:45 A	11:54 A	11:32 A	11:43 A	11:48 A	11:53 A	11:55 A	11:58 A
12:02 P	12:05 P	12:11 P	12:17 P	12:26 P	12:04 P	12:14 P	12:19 P	12:24 P	12:26 P	12:29 P
12:32 P	12:35 P	12:41 P	12:47 P	12:57 P	12:36 P	12:46 P	12:51 P	12:56 P	12:58 P	1:01 P
1:04 P	1:07 P	1:13 P	1:19 P	1:29 P	1:07 P	1:19 P	1:23 P	1:28 P	1:30 P	1:33 P
1:36 P	1:39 P	1:45 P	1:51 P	2:01 P	1:39 P	1:51 P	1:55 P	2:00 P	2:02 P	2:06 P
2:09 P	2:12 P	2:17 P	2:24 P	2:34 P	2:11 P	2:24 P	2:28 P	2:33 P	2:35 P	2:39 P
2:42 P	2:45 P	2:50 P	2:57 P	3:07 P	2:44 P	2:57 P	3:01 P	3:06 P	3:08 P	3:12 P
3:15 P	3:18 P	3:23 P	3:30 P	3:40 P	3:17 P	3:29 P	3:33 P	3:38 P	3:40 P	3:44 P
3:47 P	3:50 P	3:55 P	4:02 P	4:12 P	3:50 P	4:02 P	4:06 P	4:11 P	4:13 P	4:16 P
4:18 P	4:21 P	4:26 P	4:33 P	4:43 P	4:22 P	4:34 P	4:38 P	4:43 P	4:45 P	4:48 P
4:52 P	4:55 P	5:00 P	5:06 P	5:15 P	4:53 P	5:06 P	5:11 P	5:16 P	5:18 P	5:21 P
5:26 P	5:29 P	5:34 P	5:40 P	5:49 P	5:25 P	5:38 P	5:43 P	5:48 P	5:50 P	5:53 P
5:56 P	5:59 P	6:04 P	6:10 P	6:20 P	5:59 P	6:09 P	6:13 P	6:18 P	6:19 P	6:22 P
6:28 P	6:31 P	6:36 P	6:42 P	6:52 P	6:30 P	6:40 P	6:44 P	6:49 P	6:50 P	6:53 P
6:59 P	7:02 P	7:06 P	7:12 P	7:21 P	7:02 P	7:11 P	7:15 P	7:19 P	7:20 P	7:23 P
7:25 P	7:28 P	7:32 P	7:38 P	7:47 P	7:31 P	7:40 P	7:44 P	7:48 P	7:49 P	7:52 P

SUNDAY SCHEDULE

Green & Arroyo Pkwy	Walnut & Garfield	Villa & Lake	Allen & Orange Grove	SMV Station	SMV Station	Allen & Orange Grove	Villa & Lake	Walnut & Garfield	Raymond & Holly	Green & Arroyo Pkwy
A	B	C	D	E	F	E	D	C	B	A
8:13 A	8:16 A	8:22 A	8:28 A	8:37 A	8:16 A	8:26 A	8:30 A	8:35 A	8:37 A	8:40 A
8:44 A	8:47 A	8:53 A	8:59 A	9:08 A	8:47 A	8:57 A	9:01 A	9:06 A	9:08 A	9:11 A
9:15 A	9:18 A	9:24 A	9:30 A	9:39 A	9:18 A	9:28 A	9:32 A	9:37 A	9:39 A	9:42 A
9:45 A	9:48 A	9:54 A	10:00 A	10:09 A	9:49 A	9:59 A	10:03 A	10:08 A	10:10 A	10:13 A
10:16 A	10:19 A	10:25 A	10:31 A	10:40 A	10:19 A	10:29 A	10:33 A	10:38 A	10:40 A	10:43 A
10:46 A	10:49 A	10:55 A	11:01 A	11:11 A	10:50 A	11:01 A	11:06 A	11:11 A	11:13 A	11:16 A
11:19 A	11:22 A	11:28 A	11:34 A	11:44 A	11:21 A	11:32 A	11:37 A	11:42 A	11:44 A	11:47 A
11:50 A	11:53 A	11:59 A	12:05 P	12:14 P	11:54 A	12:04 P	12:09 P	12:14 P	12:16 P	12:19 P
12:22 P	12:25 P	12:31 P	12:37 P	12:46 P	12:24 P	12:34 P	12:39 P	12:44 P	12:46 P	12:49 P
12:53 P	12:56 P	1:02 P	1:08 P	1:18 P	12:56 P	1:08 P	1:12 P	1:17 P	1:19 P	1:22 P
1:24 P	1:27 P	1:33 P	1:39 P	1:49 P	1:28 P	1:40 P	1:44 P	1:49 P	1:51 P	1:54 P
1:56 P	1:59 P	2:04 P	2:11 P	2:21 P	1:59 P	2:12 P	2:16 P	2:21 P	2:23 P	2:27 P
2:29 P	2:32 P	2:37 P	2:44 P	2:54 P	2:31 P	2:44 P	2:48 P	2:53 P	2:55 P	2:59 P
3:02 P	3:05 P	3:10 P	3:17 P	3:27 P	3:04 P	3:16 P	3:20 P	3:25 P	3:27 P	3:31 P
3:36 P	3:39 P	3:44 P	3:51 P	4:01 P	3:37 P	3:49 P	3:53 P	3:58 P	4:00 P	4:04 P
4:10 P	4:13 P	4:18 P	4:25 P	4:35 P	4:11 P	4:23 P	4:27 P	4:32 P	4:34 P	4:37 P
4:47 P	4:50 P	4:55 P	5:02 P	5:11 P	4:45 P	4:57 P	5:01 P	5:06 P	5:08 P	5:11 P

Important Tips for Catching the Bus

- Arrive at the bus stop five to ten minutes early.
- Wait on the sidewalk by the bus stop sign, away from the curb.
- Signal the bus operator to stop for you by waving at the bus as it approaches the stop.

Safety Tips

- Use handrails when boarding and when walking to your seat.
- Remain seated while the bus is in motion.
- Smoking, drinking and eating are prohibited on all buses.

Time Points ^A

- Time points show when the bus will depart from a designated stop along the route.
- Time points show only some of the stops on the bus route. There are other bus stops for the route that are not shown on this schedule.



6:45

6:54

7:02

7:15

7:32

7:49

7:56

8:03

8:12

Sunday and Holiday Schedule

256

Southbound (Approximate Times)

ALTADENA	PASADENA			HIGHLAND PARK	EL SERENO	CSULA	EAST LOS ANGELES	COMMERCE
1	2	3	4	6	7	8	9	10
Mendocino & Lake	Allen Station	Colorado & Lake	Arroyo Pkwy & Del Mar	Figueroa & York	Huntington & Monterey	CSULA Busway Station	Eastern & Cesar Chavez	Eastern & Union Pacific
5:50A	6:00A	6:06A	6:13A	6:30A	6:44A	6:57A	7:04A	7:13A
6:50	7:00	7:06	7:13	7:30	7:44	7:57	8:04	8:14
7:50	8:00	8:06	8:13	8:31	8:47	9:00	9:07	9:18
8:50	9:00	9:06	9:13	9:32	9:48	10:02	10:09	10:20
9:50	10:00	10:06	10:13	10:32	10:50	11:04	11:11	11:22
10:50	11:00	11:06	11:14	11:33	11:51	12:05P	12:12P	12:23P
11:50	11:59	12:06P	12:14P	12:34P	12:53P	1:07	1:14	1:25
12:50P	1:00P	1:06	1:14	1:34	1:53	2:07	2:14	2:25
1:50	2:00	2:06	2:14	2:34	2:52	3:06	3:13	3:23
2:50	3:00	3:06	3:14	3:34	3:52	4:06	4:13	4:23
3:50	4:00	4:06	4:14	4:34	4:51	5:05	5:11	5:20
4:50	5:00	5:06	5:14	5:34	5:51	6:05	6:11	6:20
5:50	6:00	6:06	6:13	6:31	6:48	7:02	7:08	7:17
6:50	7:00	7:06	7:13	7:31	7:47	8:00	8:06	8:15

Sunday and Holiday Schedules

Sunday and Holiday schedule in effect on New Year's Day, Memorial Day, Independence Day, Labor Day, Thanksgiving Day and Christmas Day.

Horarios de domingo y días feriados

Horarios de domingo y días feriados en vigor para New Year's Day, Memorial Day, Independence Day, Labor Day, Thanksgiving Day y Christmas Day.

Nextrip


Text "metro" and your intersection or stop number to 41411 (example: metro vignes&cesarechavez or metro 1563). You can also visit m.metro.net or call 511 and say "Nextrip".

Nextrip

Envíe un mensaje de texto con "Metro" y la intersección de la calle o el número de su parada al 41411. Nextrip le enviará un mensaje de texto con la próxima llegada de cada autobús en esa parada. También puede visitar m.metro.net o llamar al 511 y decir "Nextrip".


Life's a trip. Plan accordingly.

Plan your trip online with
Metro's Trip Planner at
metro.net or maps.google.com.



Metro

Subject to change without notice
Sujeto a cambios sin previo aviso



metro.net
323.60.METRO
Wheelchair Hotline
800.621.7828

Travel Info
511
California Relay Service
711

Effective Dec 16, 2018

256

Metro Local
Northbound to Altadena
Southbound to Commerce
via Hill Avenue, Eastern Ave.

Saturday

Effective Dec 16 2018

256

Northbound (Approximate Times)

COMMERCE	EAST LOS ANGELES	CSULA	EL SERENO	HIGHLAND PARK	PASADENA			ALTADENA
10	9	8	7	6	5	3	2	1
Eastern & Union Pacific	Eastern & Cesar Chavez	CSULA Busway Station	Huntington & Monterey	York & Figueroa	Raymond & Del Mar	Colorado & Lake	Allen Station	Mendocino & Lake
5:22A	5:30A	5:36A	5:47A	6:01A	6:17A	6:23A	6:30A	6:39A
6:13	6:21	6:27	6:39	6:55	7:11	7:18	7:25	7:34
7:13	7:21	7:27	7:39	7:55	8:12	8:19	8:26	8:36
8:09	8:17	8:24	8:39	8:58	9:16	9:23	9:30	9:40
9:09	9:17	9:24	9:39	9:58	10:17	10:25	10:33	10:44
10:05	10:15	10:23	10:39	10:58	11:17	11:25	11:33	11:44
11:05	11:15	11:23	11:39	11:59	12:18P	12:26P	12:34P	12:46P
12:05P	12:15P	12:23P	12:39P	12:59P	1:18	1:26	1:34	1:46
1:05	1:15	1:23	1:39	1:59	2:18	2:26	2:34	2:46
2:05	2:15	2:23	2:39	2:58	3:17	3:25	3:33	3:45
3:06	3:16	3:24	3:39	3:58	4:17	4:25	4:32	4:44
4:08	4:17	4:24	4:39	4:57	5:15	5:23	5:30	5:40
5:09	5:18	5:25	5:39	5:56	6:13	6:21	6:28	6:38
6:10	6:19	6:26	6:39	6:56	7:12	7:20	7:26	7:36
7:10	7:19	7:26	7:39	7:56	8:12	8:19	8:25	8:35

Saturday

256

Southbound (Approximate Times)


ALTADENA	PASADENA			HIGHLAND PARK	EL SERENO	CSULA	EAST LOS ANGELES	COMMERCE
1	2	3	4	6	7	8	9	10
Mendocino & Lake	Allen Station	Colorado & Lake	Arroyo Pkwy & Del Mar	Figueroa & York	Huntington & Monterey	CSULA Busway Station	Eastern & Cesar Chavez	Eastern & Union Pacific
5:35A	5:45A	5:50A	5:56A	6:14A	6:30A	6:42A	6:49A	7:00A
6:21	6:31	6:36	6:42	7:00	7:16	7:29	7:36	7:47
7:14	7:24	7:30	7:36	7:54	8:10	8:23	8:30	8:41
8:11	8:22	8:28	8:35	8:53	9:10	9:23	9:30	9:41
9:10	9:21	9:27	9:34	9:52	10:10	10:24	10:31	10:42
10:07	10:18	10:24	10:32	10:52	11:10	11:24	11:31	11:42
11:07	11:18	11:24	11:32	11:52	12:10P	12:25P	12:32P	12:43P
12:05P	12:16P	12:22P	12:31P	12:51P	1:10	1:25	1:32	1:43
1:06	1:17	1:23	1:32	1:52	2:10	2:25	2:32	2:43
2:06	2:17	2:23	2:32	2:52	3:10	3:25	3:32	3:43
3:06	3:17	3:23	3:32	3:52	4:10	4:25	4:32	4:43
4:06	4:17	4:23	4:32	4:52	5:10	5:25	5:32	5:42
5:08	5:18	5:24	5:33	5:53	6:10	6:25	6:32	6:42
6:11	6:21	6:27	6:35	6:53	7:10	7:24	7:31	7:41
7:13	7:23	7:29	7:37	7:55	8:10	8:23	8:30	8:40
8:11	8:21	8:27	8:34	8:52	9:06	9:19	9:25	9:34

Sunday and Holiday Schedule

256

Northbound (Approximate Times)

COMMERCE	EAST LOS ANGELES	CSULA	EL SERENO	HIGHLAND PARK	PASADENA			ALTADENA
10	9	8	7	6	5	3	2	1
Eastern & Union Pacific	Eastern & Cesar Chavez	CSULA Busway Station	Huntington & Monterey	York & Figueroa	Raymond & Del Mar	Colorado & Lake	Allen Station	Mendocino & Lake
5:45A	5:53A	5:59A	6:11A	6:27A	6:43A	6:49A	6:55A	7:04A
6:45	6:53	6:59	7:11	7:27	7:43	7:49	7:55	8:04
7:45	7:54	8:01	8:13	8:29	8:47	8:54	9:00	9:09
8:45	8:54	9:01	9:15	9:33	9:51	9:58	10:04	10:14
9:45	9:54	10:01	10:15	10:34	10:52	11:00	11:06	11:16
10:45	10:54	11:01	11:15	11:34	11:53	12:01P	12:08P	12:18P
11:45	11:54	12:02P	12:16P	12:35P	12:54P	1:02	1:09	1:19
12:45P	12:54P	1:02	1:16	1:35	1:55	2:03	2:10	2:20
1:45	1:54	2:02	2:16	2:35	2:55	3:03	3:10	3:20
2:45	2:54	3:02	3:16	3:34	3:54	4:02	4:09	4:19
3:45	3:54	4:02	4:16	4:34	4:53	5:01	5:08	5:18
4:45	4:54	5:02	5:16	5:34	5:53	6:00	6:07	6:17



Metro is for everyone.

Please make room for seniors and people with disabilities.



Monday through Friday

Effective Dec 16 2018

256

Northbound (Approximate Times)

COMMERCE	EAST LOS ANGELES	CSULA	EL SERENO	HIGHLAND PARK	PASADENA			ALTADENA
10	9	8	7	6	5	3	2	1
Eastern & Union Pacific	Eastern & Cesar Chavez	CSULA Busway Station	Huntington & Monterey	York & Figueroa	Raymond & Del Mar	Colorado & Lake	Allen Station	Mendocino & Lake
—	—	—	—	5:34A	5:51A	5:57A	6:03A	6:14A
5:25A	5:35A	5:43A	5:58A	6:18	6:36	6:42	6:48	6:59
6:10	6:20	6:28	6:44	7:04	7:23	7:30	7:37	7:49
6:55	7:07	7:17	7:34	7:54	8:14	8:21	8:28	8:40
7:45	7:57	8:07	8:24	8:44	9:04	9:12	9:19	9:31
8:36	8:47	8:57	9:14	9:34	9:54	10:02	10:09	10:21
9:27	9:38	9:47	10:04	10:24	10:44	10:53	11:00	11:12
10:17	10:28	10:37	10:54	11:14	11:34	11:43	11:51	12:03P
11:07	11:18	11:27	11:44	12:04P	12:24P	12:33P	12:41P	12:53
11:57	12:08P	12:17P	12:34P	12:54	1:14	1:24	1:32	1:44
12:47P	12:58	1:07	1:24	1:44	2:04	2:12	2:20	2:32
1:37	1:48	1:57	2:14	2:33	2:53	3:01	3:09	3:21
2:26	2:37	2:46	3:04	3:23	3:43	3:51	3:59	4:11
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
Monday through Friday

256

Southbound (Approximate Times)

ALTADENA	PASADENA			HIGHLAND PARK	EL SERENO	CSULA	EAST LOS ANGELES	COMMERCE
1	2	3	4	6	7	8	9	10
Mendocino & Lake	Allen Station	Colorado & Lake	Arroyo Pkwy & Del Mar	Figueroa & York	Huntington & Monterey	CSULA Busway Station	Eastern & Cesar Chavez	Eastern & Union Pacific
—	—	—	—	5:46A	6:02A	6:18A	6:26A	6:39A
5:45A	5:57A	6:03A	6:10A	6:28	6:45	7:01	7:09	7:22
6:35	6:47	6:53	7:00	7:19	7:37	7:56	8:04	8:18
7:22	7:35	7:41	7:49	8:10	8:28	8:45	8:53	9:07
8:12	8:25	8:31	8:39	9:00	9:18	9:35	9:43	9:57
9:02	9:15	9:21	9:29	9:50	10:09	10:26	10:34	10:48
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10:40	10:53	11:00	11:09	11:30	11:49	12:06P	12:14P	12:28P
11:30	11:43	11:50	11:59	12:20P	12:39P	12:56	1:04	1:18
12:20P	12:33P	12:40P	12:49P	1:10	1:29	1:46	1:54	2:08
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8:38	8:49	8:55	9:03	9:21	9:36	9:48	9:55	10:05
9:20	9:31	9:38	9:45	10:03	10:18	10:30	10:37	10:47

ROUTE MAP



ALTADENA

Mendocino St

5:32A	5:46A	5:50A	5:58A	6:12A	6:29A	5:10A	5:28A	5:42A	5:51A	6:09A	6:26A
5:47	6:01	6:20	6:28	6:44	7:01	5:24	5:43	5:57	6:07	6:26	6:44
5:58	6:15	6:34	6:43	6:59	7:17	5:36	5:56	6:11	6:21	6:41	7:00
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6:33	7:03	7:34	7:48	8:06	8:26						
7:00	7:29	7:59	8:11	8:28	8:48						

For additional service, see Line 180/181 and Line 217 timetables.

Saturday, Sunday and Holiday Schedules

No service on Saturday, Sunday, New Year's Day, Memorial Day, Independence Day, Labor Day, Thanksgiving Day and Christmas Day.

Horarios de sábado, domingo y días feriados

No hay servicio en sábado, domingo, New Year's Day, Memorial Day, Independence Day, Labor Day, Thanksgiving Day y Christmas Day.

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- Terminates at Hollywood & Argyle approximately 11 minutes after time shown.

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
- Se origina en Hollywood y Argyle aproximadamente 8 minutos antes de la hora mostrada.
- Termina en Hollywood y Argyle aproximadamente 11 minutos después de la hora mostrada.

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

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Wheelchair Hotline
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Travel Info
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California Relay Service
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Effective Jun 24 2018

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Metro Rapid


Eastbound to Pasadena
Westbound to Washington/Fairfax
via Fairfax Av & Hollywood & Colorado BIs



Taking your bike on the train?

Please be courteous to other passengers and avoid blocking doors and aisles.





REFLECTIONS 413

clergy had an important role to play. Traditionally Mexicans were Catholics, orthodox in their own ways, especially in the forgotten rural villages. The Catholic faith, regardless of how diluted it may have been, and its clergy, helped to unite both rural and urban Mexicans, and to some extent, bring them together in support of traditional ways of doing things. Thus Catholicism, despite its deviations from the Church in Rome, helped build a wall of suspicion and distrust between new ideas and the people they were intended to serve. The Church stood for a historical entity of negligible benefit to reformers who wanted the past either dramatically transformed or destroyed. As radical messiahs eventually learned, even Zapata, the apostle of agrarian reform, at first glance a natural ally, had no quarrel with the Catholic religion or the clergy. To unite Mexico behind the banner of revolution often proved a herculean task because one element of the old order, the Church, while politically and materially weak still wielded a strong ideological influence over a large bloc of Mexicans of all classes, an influence generally in accord with the customs and values of the past.

Yet the usual interpretation of the role of the Church is of doubtful value. True, the Church backed Díaz, opposed Madero, and supported his successor the usurper Victoriano Huerta, and generally fought reform tooth and nail. If there were to be reform, the rebels had to deal with the Church, a pillar of the old society. However, the issue of the Church, while significant, may be essentially irrelevant to a discussion of whether Mexico had a Revolution or not. In short, the polemics over the clerical "problem" serve to camouflage the failure of the rebel leadership to come to grips with the issue of social reform. All the same, no student of the Revolution fails to include in his book or essay a lengthy analysis of the conflict between Church and state. And if liberal and sympathetic to the aims of reform, as most authors are, an accusing finger will be pointed at the Church for its dog-in-the manger attitude.

The bulk of the rebel leadership, for its part, privately scoffed at religion and publicly flaunted a distrust of priests, bishops, archbishops, and the Pope. As General Augustín Millán, Governor of Puebla in 1915, exclaimed, "the view of the clergy as one of the formidable enemies blocking reform lies in the

heart of every honest revolutionary." ⁴ The anticlerical slant of articles 3 and 130 of the Constitution of 1917 vividly testify to the depth of this belief. While Article 3 deals with education, the debate over it focused on the clerical issue, on the question of Church schools. Article 130, meanwhile, put the Church under the political control of the state.

Unfortunately, the traditional picture of the Church-state conflict more often than not obscures its nonrevolutionary character. Because of the absence of serious and impartial research, only its outlines are clearly drawn. To begin with, the clergy sided with the Re-electionist party in 1910. But, to give the devil his due, so did anti-Church Jacobins and atheists.⁵ Strangely enough, Madero and his band overlooked the support given Díaz by the clergy. Francisco Vásquez Gómez, a guiding figure in Madero's campaign, even wrote Aquiles Serdán, an anticlerical newspaperman destined to die for his loyalty to Madero, to urge him to put aside "differences over religion," arguing that nothing should "divide clericals and liberals for we are all Mexicans." ⁶ In Morelia and Michoacán, the Partido Católico Nacional supported Madero for the presidency in 1911. The following year, José López Portillo y Rojas, ostensibly the liberal candidate, became governor of Jalisco, the most Catholic province in the Republic, with the votes of the Catholic party. Wistano Luis Orozco, author of a landmark book on Mexico's social ills, thought the victory splendid, "for even though the Catholic party won," the citizens of Jalisco had thwarted an attempt to impose a governor not of their choice. He assured Madero, with whom he sympathized, that López Portillo y Rojas would "govern in accord with Madero's ideals."⁷

But the Church, to its later unhappiness, ultimately joined the chorus of attacks on Madero, and then fell into line with Huerta who, as president, attempted to turn back the clock. It was claimed that the Church lent 25 million pesos to Huerta. In reality, the Church gave only 25,000 pesos, and that as a forced loan. The Church, moreover eventually saw its error, and abandoned Huerta. As Ramón Cabrera, brother of the legendary Luis, stated in 1914, the "clergy no longer wanted to dip into its coffers" to keep Huerta in the National Palace. He looked

forward to the rapidly approaching day when both clergy and *hacendados* would be convinced that "only the Revolution should run the government."⁸ Obviously, by embracing Huerta, the clergy had won no friends among the rebels. Still, the Church, before the advent of Huerta, had come to terms with Madero, and if Cabrera truly spoke for popular sentiment, many in the rebel camp were willing to take the Church back.

Not the least among these was Venustiano Carranza, the First Chief of the Constitutionalists, the ultimate victors; he wanted peace with the Church. Had his opinion triumphed at Querétaro, Article 3 would have permitted Church schools—as in the days of don Porfirio. The anticlerical provisions of 1917 were passed over his objections. Even Alvaro Obregón, a president not noted for his sympathy for the clergy, wrote archbishops José Mora y del Río and Leopoldo Ruíz, then in exile as a protest against what they called his anticlerical policies, to assure them that his regime was "fundamentally Christian." Its objectives, he vowed, "would in no way harm the basic aims of the Catholic Church"; if not entirely in accord, "both programs essentially complemented one another." With good faith on both sides, he promised the prelates, "complete harmony would reign."⁹

Despite the willingness of Madero, Carranza, and apparently Obregón to live with the Church, a conflict erupted. One reason was because the rebels believed the Church to be wealthy. To cite one example, the Partido Liberal Democrático of Puebla requested that Carranza stop the Church from collecting money and take its wealth away, especially its real-estate holdings.¹⁰ The Church, along with the bankers, said others, was the leading owner of mortgages. In the opinion of Luis Cabrera, the Church, while suffering losses during the Reforma, had partly recouped its wealth through subterfuge.¹¹ Undoubtedly, as Cabrera believed, individual prelates of the Church had acquired lands of their own, despite legal provisions against it. One such property was the Hacienda de Jaltipa on the outskirts of Cuautitlán, a village in the state of Mexico. According to the natives there, its owner was a Church prelate.¹² One Constitutionalist officer claimed that a *rancho*, once owned by his grandfather in Micho-

acán, had been given by Díaz to Archbishop Leopoldo Ruíz.¹³ These and similar examples help confirm the ownership of land by some members of the clergy.

However, no statistics exist on the extent of Church property. Certainly, it was not on the scale confiscated by the Reforma of the 1850's and 60's; and even that proved disappointingly low. Had the rebels uncovered a large hidden cache, it seems almost certain, especially in the light of their anticlerical views, that they would have announced their startling find to the world. No such declaration ever appeared.

True, the Church hierarchy committed the unforgivable blunder of taking an adamant stance against articles 3, 5, 27, and 130 of the Constitution. Still, with the exception of 27, each of the articles dealt specifically with a religious matter. Article 3 banned Church schools; Article 5 prohibited convents and monasteries; and Article 130 placed the Church under the political control of public officials. None of these statutes, although involving important issues, touched directly on socio-economic questions. These statutes were on the outer edge of reform. The religious issue, as Carranza admitted, was not at the heart of the matter; moreover, he argued, it was time to get beyond discussions of what man could or should not believe.¹⁴

Of course, in its stance against Article 27, the Church carried its obsession with what it called its religious prerogatives too far. As José G. Parres, a member of the Comisión Nacional Agraria, declared, if the clergy did not openly sabotage the granting of lands to villages, it certainly hindered the process.¹⁵ In Puebla, in their opposition to Article 27, the prelates went so far as to dispatch teams of clergy to warn villagers not to ask for lands or risk the loss of priests to perform the rite of confession, say mass, and confer the marriage sacraments. The Church could condone the acquisition of property only when it was done by purchase.¹⁶ Yet, paradoxically, the bishop of Puebla, since his sponsorship of the first Catholic Congress on rural problems in 1903, had urged that the peasantry be given lands and schools, and this advice was endorsed by every succeeding Catholic Congress.¹⁷ In addition, by 1919, the Church had gone on record in support of reforms suggested by Antenor Sala, one of the few *hacendados* to recommend the subdivision of the

large estates. Still, even in its objections to Article 27, the hierarchy had mainly in mind Church property and that of its individual members.

By dealing harshly with the Church, politicians stoked the fires of controversy. Determined to stamp out the "clerical cancer," officials banned from Yucatán all but six priests, while in Sonora, another example of extreme irrationality, none were allowed to remain.¹⁸ Governor Plutarco Elías Calles, a future president of the Republic, equated the ills of liquor with those of the clergy and outlawed both.¹⁹ All the same, Sonora and the northern provinces in general, heartland of the rebellion and often of anticlerical bigotry, had only a handful of men of the cloth to begin with. In 1895, Sonora had just fifteen, while as late as 1908, its bishop, Ignacio Valdespino, was desperately trying to bring priests from Mexico City. Until then, only priests ordained in Sonora had been willing to work there.²⁰ Neither had the Church played an important economic role in the northern provinces. Since colonial times the landed estates there had been almost exclusively in lay hands, and had probably become completely so after the Reforma.²¹ Along with the north, the southeastern provinces had the fewest priests; yet Yucatán, like Sonora, spawned some of the worst baiters of the clergy. In all, only a small number of priests had ministered to the religious needs of Mexican Catholics: 3,576 in 1895 and 4,553 in 1910, or approximately three priests for every 10,000 inhabitants.²²

Not surprisingly, the Church viewed rebellion with jaundiced eye. As in most other parts of Mexico, Bishop Valdespino of Sonora issued a pastoral letter calling on the devil to cast a thousands spells on supporters of Madero.²³ But surely the stance of Valdespino fails to explain the virulence of the attacks on the clergy, who were numerically insignificant and relatively poor. Elsewhere, moreover, politicians and the clerical hierarchy learned to live together. In Puebla, for instance the Church elders, at the request of the ruling Maderistas, undertook to punish priests who meddled in politics.²⁴

The ire of nationalists added a further dimension to the clash. Not only were many clerics foreigners, but nearly all had come from Spain, the accursed colonial master. This probably explains some of the rancor against the clergy, for the Spaniard,

whether as priest or *mayordomo* of an *hacienda*, a job he frequently held, won the venomous hatred of nationalistic reformers. Nor did Archbishop Mora help to cool tempers by fleeing to the United States in order to fulminate against the Carranza administration. In so doing, *El Dictamen* announced, Mora had clasped hands with "imperialistic Americans," a view shared by *El Demócrata*, another of the rebel journals.²⁵ By asking foreign Catholics for aid and sympathy, and in that manner inviting outside intervention in Mexico, Mora and his cohorts endangered not merely the masters of Mexico but ran roughshod over the sensibilities of nationalists. Still, had Mexico's rulers handled the religious issue with wisdom and tact, the hierarchy might have stayed home.

None of this denies the conservative nature of the Catholic hierarchy, and perhaps of much of the rank-and-file clergy. From the beginning, they made little effort to conceal their sympathies for the status quo. For nearly three decades the Church had been a bulwark of the Díaz regime. More than a decade after that administration's fall, a large bloc of prelates backed the military coup of Adolfo de la Huerta in 1923—the last major challenge to the new leadership. But not all of the prelates or the clergy sided with De la Huerta. The archbishop of Guadalajara, one of the most powerful figures in the Church, remained in the camp of Alvaro Obregón.²⁶

Despite its conservative bent, the Church kept the loyalty of Emiliano Zapata and his peasant armies, spokesmen for the rebel agrarian wing. In modern terminology, Zapata voiced the views of "leftists." Significantly, his crusade thrived in regions where the Church had kept its moral authority alive. Of the old elements, only the Church, Francisco Bulnes pointed out, had retained its moral prestige in central and southern Mexico.²⁷ It was precisely there that the Zapatistas drew a large following. Nor did Zapata and his disciples attempt to hide their Catholic commitment. The Virgin de Guadalupe, anathema to the *come santo*, saint-baiting, rebels in the rival camps, adorned their banners. As a mayor of a Zapatista enclave declared, "Zampahuacán is and always will be Catholic."²⁸ Even the inhabitants of Villa Ayala, site of the heralded Zapatista plan which bears its name, rejected any attempt to convert Catholic temples into schools.

"The Church," to cite a letter from Villa Ayala to Zapata, "must not be confused with the profane!"²⁹ To their dismay, Carrancista politicians discovered that priests, the hated *curas*, had staunch allies in the villages of Oaxaca, whose inhabitants welcomed no attacks on churches.³⁰ Yet nearly all rebel factions looked upon the Zapatistas, their Catholic faith notwithstanding, as radicals.

Political heritage, too, played a major role. Obviously, Mexico lacked genuine political parties, and outside of the villages and the early municipalities, lacked any tradition of popular decision making. The Spaniards and their Republican successors had long ago implanted a system of government by manipulation and by an élite. That system resulted in widespread cynicism, which became in itself a major hurdle to overcome. After centuries of fraud and deception, of false promises and political skullduggery, few Mexicans were ready to believe even honest reformers. This *desconfianza*, a distrust that verged on the refusal to have faith in fellow Mexicans, and almost in mankind in general, undercut efforts at revolution. To his bitter disillusionment, Ricardo Flores Magón confronted this reality early on. So, paradoxically, a Mexico with weak political institutions had forged one uniquely its own. While nontraditional, and more of the spirit than of the temporal world, this absence of faith in what was possible, a logical product of centuries of chicanery, helped sabotage efforts to make revolution a reality.

Nor was the time ripe for noncapitalist transformations of society, the essence of revolution in the twentieth century. Unsympathetic and distrustful of socialist rhetoric and deeds, Western capitalist countries led by the United States managed the affairs of the world. Few expected the Soviet Union, a recent arrival on the scene, to survive. At best, the 1910s were an age of reform, of Western middle-class progressives who wanted to wipe clean the tarnish accumulated by capitalism during the age of robber barons, to restore free competition, and to eliminate the sins of monopoly. This was the gist of Woodrow Wilson's ideas. In the Western Hemisphere, the Radical party in Argentina, and José Batlle y Ordóñez in Uruguay—the soothsayers of the day—had taken their cue from like beliefs. To complicate life for the social revolutionary, a decade ruled by conservatives

set in with the end of the war in Europe. Men satisfied with things as they were, won control of politics in the United States. They would not tolerate radical experiments next door.

Worse still a severe financial crisis swept the postwar world, hitting Mexico with sledge-hammer blows. Silver, copper, and lead, its chief mineral exports, with a value of 187.5 million pesos in 1920, had dropped to 98.6 million pesos by 1921.³¹ One-third of Mexico's copper and silver mines shut down operations because of low market prices.³² Exports of cattle, *ixtle*, and henequen suffered similar sharp drops in price. For a while, the value of petroleum exports rose, but eventually they too went the way of the others when production declined after 1921. As the value of Mexican exports plummeted downward, the Treasury by 1923, reported Aarón Sáenz, tottered on the brink of bankruptcy.³³ So bad was the state of national revenue, according to Adolfo de la Huerta, the chief of the Treasury, that even paying the army on time became impossible.³⁴ Passage of the Fordney-McCumber Tariff by the American Congress in 1922, a reversal of the Underwood Tariff on 1913, left Mexico with the onerous task of finding a solution to its economic difficulties while, concomitantly, paying higher duties on its exports to the United States, its principal customer. For ironically, despite a decade of revolutionary rhetoric and nationalistic platforms, trade ties between Mexico and the United States had grown stronger. When Obregón left office in 1924, American businessmen were both buying more and selling more to Mexico than ever before. Still, if funds were required for reform, the future looked bleak for social change.

become an active force in dealing with police brutality and harassment toward Mexican Americans in southern California. In 1961 the somewhat conservative CSO board refused to support direct farm labor demands, and Chavez left the organization to become personally involved in the farm labor movement in his wife's hometown of Delano, California (Matthiessen, 1969).

Though an increasing sense of ethnic pride was no doubt a positive factor in the militancy of the post-World War II era, yet another dynamic process was in operation, too. In the past, the Mexican Americans had accepted the mandate of being "good losers" as a means of making Anglos feel superior—but at the expense of their own self-image. However, as Mexican Americans developed more pride in their own race and more sophistication about Anglos and their society, they became aware that sometimes the game is played with rigged rules. Thus, though they separated themselves from the exploitive situation during the era of Ethnic Separatism, they went further and sought to change the rules of the game in the era following.

THE PERIOD OF ETHNIC AUTONOMY AND RADICALISM (1963–1969)

The period from 1950 through the early 1960s was marked by political and social activism in the United States. Early movements focused on the plight of blacks but soon spread to other minorities. In order to increase sensitivity among whites over the plight of blacks, student activists and black leaders began organizing public protests. Peace marches, acts of civil disobedience, and mass confrontations followed. Among Mexican Americans this general awakening found its voice in the Chicano movement, which gained publicity through the activities of its militant wing.

Sena Rivera correctly argues that there has not been a single Chicano movement but rather many specific collective actions within the overall movement—which is not unlike the pattern of any other emergent social force. He distinguishes three dominant ideologies in Chicanismo which range, politically

speaking, from far Left anarchists to far Right reactionaries. The small group to the Left are those proclaiming cultural nationalism, the vast majority in the middle represent the various degrees of cultural pluralism, and the small number on the Right call for total acculturation to Anglo society. Rivera further contends that, ironically, the concessions wrung from the dominant society are obtained through the sacrifices by the militant group, but generally benefit the Right, which has remained personally secure by "playing it safe" and not getting involved. There is some evidence to support the contrary notion that the Right is strategically rather than militantly involved and gets the rewards because, in terms of organizational prowess, they deserve them.

Even within the militant segment of the Chicano movement there are such varied bases for organization as to make coordination of these several thrusts a major dilemma. Merckx's and Greigo's (1971) analysis of ethnic activism in northern New Mexico delineates three distinct groups that represent completely different social, economic, and educational goals, all of which are identified with Spanish American activism. First, there is the Alianza, led by the dynamic Reies Tijerina and consisting of a loose coalition of rural Spanish Americans and Indians seeking to regain their ancestral lands. Second, there is the Brown Berets, manned by urban ghetto youth seeking to improve their present status through radical methods. And third, there is the United Mexican-American Students (UMAS), a student organization that seeks through organizational expertise and educational attainment to establish a power position for articulating its ethnic demands upon the existing social system. Though all these factions support one another, the diversity of objectives, methods, and priorities diffuses their efforts and creates functional divisions within the overall Chicano movement.

Inasmuch as the major organizational thrust of this period of ethnic autonomy and radicalism was spearheaded by the militant Left of the Chicano movement, our analysis concentrates mainly on this. But it should be remembered that reform-ideology groups, not characterized by radical confrontation techniques, are also active in the Chicano movement, devising

Mexican Americans
by ELLwyn R. Stoddard
Random House, Inc. 1973
West Hanover, Mass

and initiating strategies that they expect to use in providing relief for Mexican Americans.

A case study of political action in Crystal City, Texas, over a six-year period (1963-1969) clearly illustrates the shift in emphasis from separatism to militant radicalism. Crystal City, a community of 10,000, is 75 percent Mexican American and 25 percent Anglo. During 1962 a poll tax drive was initiated to vote out of office the local Anglo elite, which had never been opposed politically because threats of economic retaliation had kept Mexican Americans from registering to vote. Since a large number of the Mexican Americans in 1963 were union members and by recent court ruling were protected against losing their jobs for political reasons, support of the union organization served as a protective shield for them when they became politically active. The Mexican American candidates for the five council positions were all working-class persons. As potential victory for these candidates became apparent, support from PASO was extended. The stage was set and the Mexican Americans won by a landslide. Unfortunately, the victors, unseasoned in political life, made errors and became factionalized. They lost the subsequent 1965 election but later gained back some strength in 1967 and 1971.

Though much had been accomplished by separatist political action through the established political processes, a more militant element provided the leadership for more rapid social change within the local school system. When administrative appeals for stamping out discrimination in the high school had been exhausted, local Chicano leadership organized student confrontations. The reactionary stance of the school board activated Mexican parents to rally behind their high school children. The high school students, with support from parents and from the Mexican American Youth Organization (MAYO), were victorious. Direct confrontation, in causing traditional Anglo power figures to overreact, welded together the Mexican American community. From then on, school boycotts and similar strategies brought about institutional changes that even the Anglo administrators confessed *would not have happened without the extreme means adopted*.

Although the origins of Chicanismo as an identifiably organ-

ized national movement are somewhat obscure, Cuellar (1970) suggests that the formalized organization grew out of a group of conferences held at Loyola University in Los Angeles in the summer of 1966. These conferences, originally conceived by the Catholic sponsors as a middle-class Mexican student gathering, attracted others who were *not* students and not middle class but who nevertheless were drawn to the ideology of La Causa. Another suggestion is that it began less universally with the nativistic religious leadership of Reies Tijerina in northern New Mexico and subsequently became articulated through the civil rights movements in the United States.

Chicanismo was heavily influenced in its direction and tactics by strong, charismatic leaders who early emerged as symbols of ethnic pride and courage. Three men stand out among these many fine Chicano leaders: Reies Lopez Tijerina in New Mexico, César Chavez in California, and Rudolfo "Corky" Gonzales in Colorado.³ A short biography of each one will reveal his contribution to the overall Chicano movement.

Many writers have given detailed histories of Reies Lopez Tijerina, the fiery leader of the Alianza land-grant heirs in northern New Mexico, and the famous episode of the "court-house raid." Particularly notable is the account by Gardner (1970), which begins with the birth of this dynamic Chicano leader, on September 21, 1926, on a heap of cotton sacks in a one-room adobe shack outside Falls City, Texas. His mother, a very religious woman, instilled a strong religious fervor into Tijerina in his early years. His father, a share-cropper, kept alive in young Reies the memories of land seizures by Anglos and gringo atrocities. Even in his preschool years, Reies was a visionary child. Later, at age fifteen, when his family was working in Michigan, he received a copy of the New Testament and read it from cover to cover. At nineteen he entered a Texas bible school run by the Assembly of God. Although he was later expelled, he nevertheless began his ministry in California and was eventually given his license. Tijerina experienced wild, cyclical moods in which he would leave his family and seek isolation for the purpose of purifying himself; twice, at a sudden urge, he gave away his automobile and clothing and lived for a time as a penniless recluse. He was a persuasive orator.

With seventeen families who followed him as their spiritual head, he established the Valley of Peace in the Arizona desert. In 1958 he arrived in northern New Mexico to assist the forty-year-old Abiquiu Corporation of Tierra Amarilla in its fight for restoration of land-grant rights. Tijerina believed that God and justice were on his side. His presence there was felt to be the fulfillment of the legend that had promised of strangers from the East who would afflict Mexican Americans and a leader from the people who would arise and make the conquerors return to their homes crying (Gonzalez, 1969:99).

In January 1960, Tijerina went to Mexico to study firsthand the land-grant documents. There he found an old volume, authorized in 1570 by Philip II of Spain, which was a recompilation of basic policies pertaining to Spanish colonial laws, including land grants. Using this as his law, and in defiance of the existing laws of New Mexico, he was ready to pursue his fight for reparations to land grantees, who had lost more than 1 million acres of land.

On February 2, 1963, he formed the Alianza de Las Mercedes and boldly proclaimed in power and emotional oratory that the millennium was near. Although violence would come first, members of the Alianza would enter this period living on their own land. Thus, Tijerina's early thrust was as the leader of a nativistic religious movement, whereas his subsequent explosive appearance as a national Chicano hero was part of a civil rights movement.

The Alianza held its second convention in August 1964, still unnoticed by the mass media. During this year Felix Martinez, a leader in the movement, visited Watts and Delano. He returned with the evaluation that the slow, peaceful methods of César Chavez did not cause the larger society to become aware of the problem as rapidly and forcefully as had the riot in Watts, adding that "revolution speeds up evolution." The Alianza was rapidly gaining membership, mostly converts brought in by the persuasive and charismatic Tijerina, or "King Tiger" as he was affectionately known. The membership declared a preference for the old Spanish laws that had formerly governed their land-grant acreages. Individual cases of arson, fence cutting, and even stealing stock were common. Stolen items were returned only upon payment of

fees equal to those charged by the Forest Service for grazing privileges on U.S. government lands. On July 4, 1966, the Alianza faithful marched from Albuquerque to Santa Fe to present their grievances to the governor. While momentarily exciting, the march produced no results. Then in its fourth convention in September, Alianza established an independent city-state called the Pueblo de San Joaquin del Rio de Chama, free from the governments of New Mexico and the United States. It proclaimed a dedicated Anglo lawyer, a trusted friend of the Alianza leaders, as Don Barney Cuarto Cesar (King Emperor of All the Indies). Immediately following, documents were issued with the proclamation that the U.S. Forest Service had been notified of the intent of the true owners to claim the land that was theirs by right of inheritance. Subsequently, decrees were issued demanding that present illegal owners vacate the lands or face expulsion. In October 1966, hoping by a majestic assumption of authority to settle the question of land-grant ownership without forty years of litigation, Tijerina and his followers headed a one-hundred-car motorcade into the Echo Amphitheatre, a camping area within the Carson National Forest and on the ground included within the original Tierra Amarilla land grant. Little occurred that was not of a festive nature. One week later, fifty vehicles came to challenge the U.S. Forest Service, the caretakers of the land. Rangers without weapons had been posted to collect the dollar entrance fee and to note license plate numbers of those refusing to pay. However, anxious Alianza leaders "arrested" the rangers and, under the laws governing their independent city-state of San Joaquin del Rio de Chama, proceeded to hold a trial and convict them of trespass. Their trucks were impounded, but later the prisoners were released along with their vehicles. Tijerina and his followers camped over the weekend, building fires and securing local game for food. By Wednesday, when federal and forestry officers moved in, there were only a few persons left including José Salazar, the *alcalde* of the newly proclaimed independent city-state. Why had there been such a flagrant violation of federal laws? Tijerina answered:

Publicity. This time the whole world will know of our dilemma. This time they will have to charge us with tres-

passing and take us to court, and then we will see whose land it really is (Gardner, 1970: 132).

Instead, however, the federal officials carefully prepared charges against five Alianza leaders for putting government property to personal use, assaulting forest rangers, and preventing them from carrying out their duties. There were no charges for trespassing this time or any subsequent time during Tijerina's campaign.

In April 1967, Tijerina met with Governor Cargo, and soon a political war between the Republican governor and the Democratic district attorney Alfonso Sanchez emerged, the latter demanding immediate, forceful restraints against the Alianza and the governor seeking to take a more moderate approach. As illegal incidents of arson and fence cutting and public proclamations of defiance increased, the district attorney obtained a court order to force Tijerina to reveal his entire Alianza membership. Public charges had been made that the act of trying to take land by force was similar to Castro's tactics in Cuba and that Tijerina was therefore a Communist. The John Birch Society issued similar statements and printed massive numbers of handouts linking Tijerina to Communism. Upon receiving the order in May 1967 to make his membership and contribution lists known, Tijerina disbanded the Alianza and resigned as president, thus protecting his loyal supporters from embarrassment (for example, a twelve dollar contribution by the governor's wife was made public later). The setting for the courthouse raid was being prepared.

In June, Tijerina made plans to have a meeting of land claimants in Coyote, New Mexico, and to reorganize the Alianza as a Confederation of Free City-States. There, they would plan new strategy for getting their land claims into court. Tensions grew. Unknown persons began fires in land-grant forests, more fences were destroyed, and both landowners and claimants began to carry firearms. Alfonso Sanchez sought to have a restraining order served on Tijerina, banning the proposed June third meeting in Coyote, but he could not locate him. Finally, Sanchez made a statement on radio that all persons who intended to go to Coyote for the meeting would be arrested,

and he arbitrarily banned all public assemblies. In the ensuing arrests of members arriving in automobiles, organizational records, along with firearms and ammunition, were seized. Sanchez again publicly branded Tijerina as a Communist because he had tried to secure the land by force. The Alianza leadership was pushed to the wall. The former occupation of National Forest Lands episode had not gotten their claims into a court of law, and this arbitrary abridgement of the right to peaceful assembly was one more sign of the right of the authorities to violate constitutional laws when it furthered their purpose. Radical methods were the only means left to preserve their honor and their cause. Alfonso Sanchez became their target, and they planned to make a citizen's arrest of him and charge him with unlawful conduct in exceeding the authority of his office. It was voted at Canjilon by the Alianza faithful to go to the Rio Arriba courthouse on the morrow. There would be no shooting, but arms would be carried for defense. It did not work out as planned.

On June 5, twenty men in five vehicles quietly eased into Rio Arriba, and, surprising the law officers, judges, and workers inside the courthouse, looked for Sanchez (who was not there). Pent-up emotions burst forth and counter-offensives brought quick retaliation on each side. A state patrolman named Sais was shot in the lung and the jailer Eulogio Salazar wounded in the head as he dove through a window to escape (Salazar was mysteriously murdered months later). Another deputy was knocked unconscious. Alianza members Baltazar Martinez and seventy-two-year-old Baltazar Apodaca took two hostages, deputy sheriff Pete Jaramillo and a reporter, Larry Calloway, back to Canjilon in a pickup truck, but they later escaped. The manhunt began! Five hundred men, including the National Guard (with two tanks), the FBI, state police, New Mexico Mounted Patrol, and the Apache Police, combed the mountains for the courthouse raiders. Alianza members' houses were searched and left in a shambles. A detachment of troops was dispatched to the Alianza camp at Canjilon, whose thirty-nine men, women, and children were held hostage at the points of bayonets for twenty-four hours in inclement weather. By Wednesday morning, eleven of the twenty raiders were in

custody, and on Saturday morning, the last of the leaders, "King Tiger" Tijerina, was apprehended.

With the national spotlight on him and his followers, Tijerina had become increasingly more radical because he felt that only by combining his fight with other Chicano leaders and those of other disenfranchised ethnic groups could a solid and powerful front force the land issue to be resolved. Released on bond after a few weeks, he became ever more militant in his demands for a court hearing on the land grants. He proclaimed that the leader of the "Santa Fe Ring," Thomas L. Catron, was really a Jew. In a further foray into racism, he announced the "New Breed" of people—the Indo Spanish—who would rule over their own lands in the northern New Mexico area. Corky Gonzales and Bert Corona praised his bravado. Tijerina superficially embraced the Black Power movement with Martin Luther King, James Forman, Floyd McKissick, Ron Karenga, and Ralph Featherstone, as well as the cause of Tomas Banyacya of the Hopi nation and other Indian leaders. The power base gained through pledges of mutual support was more than neutralized by antiblack feelings among his "New Breed" followers. This strategy had backfired and his support declined markedly. Later, in 1967, he became a codirector of the Poor People's March on Washington, hoping that the plight of his people would be given a national spotlight. Instead the problem of land-grant ownership was shoved to the background, and the salient issues of his criminal charges and court battles, backlash from the Poor People's March, and growing lack of financial and moral support spelled a further decline in Tijerina's mass appeal. In 1958 he had attempted to revive his power base through political means, but the chance was now gone. Because of his court record his name could not be on the New Mexico state ballot as a candidate for governor. The personal appeal that had gained him followers could not be transferred to the lieutenant whose name appeared in his place.

A year later, Tijerina, now somewhat tired and despondent, gave up the Alianza leadership declaring that "there were too many old debts to pay." His voluntary abdication meant the loss of their "prophet" and that the legends of Indo-Hispanic greatness were yet to be fulfilled. Whether the illegal tactics of

a frustrated and hostile minority are contrary to the spirit of American freedom or to law and order, as claimed by northern New Mexican officials, is subject to question. Whether a Tierra Amarilla land grant in 1832 to Manuel Martinez "and those who should wish to accompany him; the forests, roads and watering places to be kept free, according to the customs prevailing in all settlements [Gardner, 1970:52, 67-68]"—which was reaffirmed by the U.S. government in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848, a treaty that accepted such grants as legally binding—takes precedence over 1970 federal and state property rights, has never been settled in our courts. But one fact remains: with the loss of Tijerina's bold and courageous leadership, the American dream of ethnic equality and justice for all died a little.

The child of migrant parents, César Chavez, too, had experienced poverty and had learned the necessity of organized protest through the example of his father and uncle, who backed labor union organizations. He was introduced to Fred Ross, director of the California-based Community Service Organization (CSO), through Father Donald McConnel, a mutual friend, and he rose through CSO ranks, mastering in the process the skills of organization and delegation of power (Matthiessen, 1969). After more than a decade of service in CSO, part of the time as director of the San Joaquin Valley locals, Chavez became appalled by the lack of concern on the part of the organization over the plight of farm and urban laborers. When his activities on behalf of CSO championed the causes of labor, newly attracted professionals and white-collar leaders of the CSO board balked. He then severed his affiliation with CSO and went back to Delano, California, his wife's hometown, to organize farm workers at the grass-roots level. Chavez felt that workers should have the power, through organization, to improve their economic life.

Late in the summer of 1965, Philippine field workers in California, under AWOC leader Itliong, decided to walk out on the vine growers unless they were given a more humane wage. On September 8, when demands were not met, they did walk out, and on September 16, Chavez was proclaimed as the strike leader for both the Philippine and the Mexican American

workers. The weeks of the strike dragged on, and the little money that had been raised was spent. Nevertheless, the farm workers stood behind Chavez, even though their families were in dire need of basic necessities. Just prior to Christmas, when events looked blackest for the impoverished strike families, Walter Reuther of the AFL-CIO declared his organization's support of the National Farm Workers Organizing Committee (NFWOC) strike against the vine growers. With a nationwide boycott against table grapes and California wines, Schenley Industries settled, in the late spring of 1966, and after that the big growers signed one by one until the fall of 1970, when the last major vine grower met the union's demands for a minimum wage. The story of the worker marches has since been retold in narratives, in documentaries, and in drama (most notably by Luis Valdez and his *El Teatro Campesino* troop).

Uniting educated Anglo and Mexican American college students with uneducated farm laborers in a common cause showed the organizational genius and personal dedication of Chavez. Steiner (1970:237-238) suggests that with this movement came the first break in the traditional barrier between lower-class Chicanos and middle-class Mexican Americans. Chavez also proved that long-range goals can be reached without violence, through effective organization and legitimate procedures.

As the word spread about *la lucha* (the struggle) from the vineyards of California, another more extreme movement was in the making. Noting the economic and political gains of the Black Power movement, some Chicano leaders began to question whether legal procedures were an effective means for gaining equal rights for Mexican Americans and for correcting past injustices. Symbolic of this more radical organizational viewpoint is Rudolfo "Corky" Gonzales.

Gonzales was at one time a well-known professional boxer. A local barrio hero in Denver, he served as a political go-between for almost every federal poverty program in the area. In his capacity as ethnic representative, he took an active role in the expanding number of conferences on Mexican American problems, but he finally became disgusted with what he consid-

ered to be the ineffectiveness of that role and resigned all his positions in 1969, declaring that those who cooperate with federal programs are guilty of "sell-out tokenism." An accomplished writer of plays and poetry, he expressed his symbolic rejection of Anglo success in his highly publicized poem "I am Joaquin."

Observers see Joaquin as an autobiographical persona, expressing Gonzales' most intimate feelings as he has lived and practiced them, not as he has observed them in others. Joaquin pours forth his soul as he explains the complex world in which he lives, where he is scorned by Gringos who dominate his society and whose rules are confusing to him. Although his forebears lost the economic struggle with Anglo society, he has won in that which matters most—preserving his culture. He must now make a fateful choice between the constrictions of an empty stomach and a full soul or acquiesce to Anglos and, with full stomach, become emasculated "in the grasp of American social neurosis." He despairs as he watches his children rising to mediocrity in a society which forces them to forget not only their noble traditions, but him! Yes, anyone reading the poem will know that "Joaquin" is Corky Gonzales. To the Mexican American Gonzales is the popular folk hero who has rejected Anglo success *to be with his people* (Steiner, 1970:378-392).

Gonzales first came into the national spotlight in 1965, when he renounced his role as Anglo go-between and proceeded to organize the Crusade of Justice in Denver as a "pure ethnic movement." This organization grew out of a civil rights battle involving legal discrimination against Mexican Americans. Gonzalez was an avowed separatist, and his writings were widely circulated by UMAS organizations and MAPA leadership. By the spring of 1968 he claimed a membership of 1,800 in his Crusade for Justice and was recognized as a separatist leader within the overall Chicano movement. In his declarations at a UCLA symposium (1968), with delegates from twenty-five Mexican American groups, Gonzales advocated a Brown Power approach to gain a place for Chicanos in Anglo society. "Integration is an empty bag . . . it's like getting up out of the

small end of the funnel. One may make it, but the rest of the people stay at the bottom." Gonzales went on to renounce Chicanos who worked for Mexican American betterment through the institutions of the larger society, bitterly complaining that the young Mexican Americans were being siphoned off to stabilize a racist society in the United States rather than to assist in tearing it down to start over on an equalitarian basis. "All the new leaders we developed a year ago are now working for the poverty program. They were bought out. They are not provoking a revolution [Torgerson, 1968:286]."

Gonzales was supported in his declarations by Tijerina, free on appeal from jail. Tijerina, with Gonzales, had recently joined with Black Power leadership to further the work of black and brown peoples as a single power bloc. Bert Corona, head of the successful MAPA, also attended the symposium, as did Luis Valdez, representing César Chavez (who was currently on a twenty-five day fast and unable to attend).

Probably the zenith of the Brown Power surge occurred in 1969 in Denver, on Palm Sunday. At a national Chicano Youth Liberation Conference on that day Gonzales declared La Raza to be a separate and independent nation.⁴ Of these three outstanding leaders of the Chicano movement, Tijerina was the fiery prophet and Chavez the intellectual organizer who reached the campesino and college student alike, but Corky Gonzales was its poet, with a strong right arm raised in defiance.

CHICANISMO AS A SOCIAL MOVEMENT Scholars have identified certain stages within social movements: the initial stage, marked by traumatic birth pains of emergent ideologies, the middle stage of explosive experimentation, and the culminating stage of increased stability. Chicanismo exhibits such a pattern. First comes the awareness that Chicanos themselves can do something about their present subjugation if they unite to combat ethnic discrimination. Next emerges a motivational stage, characterized by explosive rhetoric, anger, and self-purification, which may lead to a feeling of extreme ethnic nationalism. A final cooling off stage begins with contemplation and new insight. Earlier outbursts are recognized for what they were—tools, a means for breaking away from dependency on

Anglos. This final period consists of positive planning and application of tactics and strategies designed to accomplish self-determined ethnic goals, which is an indication of organizational maturation.

The awareness phase, in which pent-up frustrations are released, is illustrated in this widely publicized letter from a Mexican American high school girl, reflecting on her experience in the Anglo world:

I am a Mexican-American. I was not always one. Once upon a time I was just a human being who had happened to be born in the United States. Sometime during the process of receiving my education I became a Mexican-American. Perhaps it was during my primary years when a teacher with blue eyes told me "Wash your hands . . . *you people* always manage to be filthy . . ." or maybe it was the teacher who told me "We don't want to hear you speaking *that language* here again. . . ." Somewhere along the road I learned that "*you people*" meant Mexican American and that "*that language*" meant Spanish. . . . They taught me many things and they taught other Mexicans, too. We learned our lessons well. Some of us majored in Hatred, which we stored up in our hearts until the day we could use it. Others took up Bitterness, which we engraved upon ourselves in forms of distrust of any Anglos . . . I am a Mexican-American. I want my people to have their rights . . . I want to become more than a second-class citizen . . . I want to be proud of what I am [Rodriguez, 1969].

The explosive self-purification phase, with its emotional reactions and awakening identities, brings forth angry and often vituperative outbursts such as those printed in the Chicano press or chanted at rallies of *La Gente* ("The People"). Appeals for ethnic support and unity are exemplified in this excerpt from a college newspaper.

Many *Chicanos* on this campus still manifest a feeling of inferiority—even the more militant ones. But *Chicanos* must now comprehend that they are not inferior and in fact are superior in some ways. *Chicanos*, do not believe

that the *gabacho's* [slang for Anglo] life, values and culture are better. We have a rich heritage. . . . Once you are secure in your identity as a *Chicano*, you can function better in the Anglo world. Be proud of what you are and demand what you have coming [Garcia, 1969].

Radical groups, in their desire to maintain their Mexican heritage, functionally destroy many basic Mexican institutions by the very tactics they have employed in their organization. For example, the equality of role among male and female protestors in leadership positions runs counter to the traditional dominance of male over female in Mexican society. Nevertheless, among the militant Chicanos an overwhelming ethnic pride has emerged, and regardless of any other accomplishments of their organizations, the emphasis on a positive, self-determined identity has been a major contribution to ethnic unity and self-reliance. As Briegel notes:

Although the militants have yet to make a noticeable contribution to the economic or social situation of the Mexican-American community, they have increased the awareness of their problem in the larger community. The militants have created the greatest potential for change of any group of Mexican-American organizations [1970: 178].

In retrospect, it appears that the Chicano movement gained most of its support by maintaining an anti-Establishment position (a reflection of lower-class membership) rather than by emphasizing Mexican heritage. Yet, interestingly enough, the militant Mexican American leaders are very much a product of Anglo society, more Anglo in their attitudes than many of their fellows, and much more aware of their rights as Americans.

The constructive planning phase, in which effective tactics for accomplishing Chicano goals have been altered sufficiently by the national decline of radicalism generally, can be considered as an entirely new period of organizational development. The Chicano generation have their "identity phase" behind them for the most part. They are ready to use this newly dis-

covered ethnic unity as an efficient instrument for acquiring other social and economic goals. Rather than proceeding along the route of ethnic autonomy, they have redirected their thrust toward a strategy of penetration and power within existing social institutions. This will be discussed subsequently as the fifth and last organizational period.

CAMPUS CHICANISMO AND ETHNIC STUDIES Commensurate with the growth of the Brown Power movement in 1966 and 1967, many college and university students, especially those originally from the barrios, sought identity through campus Chicano organizations, among them the United Mexican American Students (UMAS), the Mexican American Student Association (MASA), the Mexican American Student Confederation (MASC), and the Movimiento Estudiantial Chicano de Aztlán (MECHA), all in California; and the Mexican American Youth Organization (MAYO) and the National Organization of Mexican American Students (NOMAS), both in Texas. Some of these had as their primary aim the politicization of the barrio or the radicalization of Mexican American high school students. Others worked principally to alter the campus atmosphere to provide a more favorable and equitable educational experience for the Chicano college student. It was due mainly to the organized insistence of these student groups that Chicano and ethnic study programs were adopted as part of higher education. In support of these student-led organizations were the small number of isolated Chicano faculty members, plus the organized strength of the Association of Mexican-American Educators (AMAE), the intellectual reservoir of ethnic scholarship. This formal organization became increasingly more activist-oriented as it succeeded in modifying curriculum and obtaining staff concessions. In 1969 at the annual AMAE convention members criticized specific corporate enterprises, local governments, and select federal agencies for their discriminatory practices.

Another source of educational assistance for campus organizations and ethnic studies came from the regional Cooperative Education Laboratories, federally supported research and information centers. The one located in New Mexico is especially

sensitive to Chicano problems. In June 1966, with the assistance of the dean of education at the University of New Mexico, the Southwestern Cooperative Education Laboratory, Inc. (SCEL) was formed. It is heavily subsidized by the U.S. Office of Education, and its efforts bear heavily on the problems of bilingual education, training teachers for bicultural awareness, and fostering research activities that will destroy negative ethnic stereotypes.

College or university-based ethnic studies programs were designed to promote ethnic cohesion and pride among Mexican American students. To do this, Chicano studies sought to substitute for Anglo-biased history, literature, art, and social science that reflected more of Mexican American culture. To the Mexican American, the story of America does not begin with the Pilgrims at Plymouth Rock. This event is of relatively recent origin in terms of the Mexican's Indian and Spanish heritage, which spans nearly 1,000 years. Although curricula were developed to assist the Chicano student to know his own heritage, these same courses were a boon to non-Chicanos who wanted to know more about the group and its historical, social, and cultural legacy. Amado Padilla reported to a recent sociological gathering that in the introductory Chicano studies courses at the University of California in Santa Barbara, more than 50 percent of the enrollees are Anglos—an indication of the popularity of these offerings among nonethnic students.

On each campus, the variations in local resources, historical development, and ethnic student population dictate a different approach to Chicano studies programs. After a comprehensive survey of Chicano personnel and programs, Rochin describes the variations he finds in the eight-campus University of California system.

Not all campuses have a Chicano Studies Program *per se*. Berkeley has a Chicano Studies Division which is within a Department of Ethnic Studies. Davis functions with a Chicano Studies Program with faculty members teaching Chicano courses out of the traditional academic departments. Irvine has a Comparative Cultures Program with a Chicano sub-component. The Los Angeles program

relies on a Chicano Studies Center which serves principally as an academic research center. Riverside has an interdisciplinary Mexican-American Studies Program with faculty members teaching out of their respective departments. Santa Barbara functions with a Department of Chicano Studies and a Chicano Research Center. Santa Cruz is just developing a Chicano program within a new Urban Studies College. And San Diego's Chicano Studies is a sub-component of its Third College. Of the eight campuses, Berkeley, Irvine, Riverside and San Diego offer majors in Ethnic, Cultural or Chicano Studies [1972:2].

Extensive comparisons of structural-functional similarities in Chicano studies programs are difficult, inasmuch as many of the programs are in different sequential stages of development, from recent inception to full-fledged, mature, permanent programs. As an analytical tool for investigating Chicano studies programs, W. Kennedy (1972) outlines the major stages through which the program at San Diego proceeded. The first phase was concerned with securing permission for its establishment; it was funded and became operational when recruitment started. The second phase consisted of the actual functioning of the program: recruiting more cadre and students and coming to grips with a dependence on the Anglo structure for economic support. In the third stage the program was well underway, its participants chiefly concerned with program autonomy and with university service to the barrio population. This phase is often possible only after continuous institutional support has been secured. The final stage of maturation in the Chicano studies program was represented by a full acceptance of the program by outside agencies.

A too successful Chicano program that produces a sudden large following creates problems. An increased number of students to be served will result in an increasingly bureaucratized organization and a more complex network of relationships with external organizations. This dissipates the close personal ties of a small struggling Chicano contingent. Chicano leadership at this point becomes concerned with the loss of revolutionary zeal and fears co-optation of its program as it becomes more stabilized.

At the University of New Mexico the ethnic studies program until recently was an older working program emphasizing curriculum and identity integration for the Mexican American student. Specific instructors and departmental offerings were investigated to determine the extent to which Mexican culture and identity were presented correctly. Approved course offerings and instructors were then recommended to minority students as being consistent with identity and scholarship goals for the Spanish American students there. These minority students selected a college major in an established academic discipline, and the ethnic studies operation became an auxiliary program to balance out the negative effects of Anglo-biased history and literature courses and to provide a coordinated voice for ethnic dissatisfactions. This approach dealt more rationally with the problem of getting employment for Mexican American graduates and considered the primary goal of college training in preparing students for a good-paying occupation. The fact is that there are few job openings for a graduate who has majored in Chicano studies, whereas traditional majors can readily compete for positions within the present economic system. A San Diego professor notes this dilemma:

Although the proponents of Aztlán suggest that such a compromise is corrupt, they offer no solution to how one supports one's family. Thus, there is some question as to the literal or symbolic solidarity to be found in the concept of Aztlán [Kennedy, 1972:7].

A realistic evaluation of Chicano studies programs focuses on the short-range goals of ethnic autonomy, ethnic pride, and group identity compared with the long-range goal of economic and social independence from the dominant society. Whereas majors in Chicano studies will be well prepared in the first, only Mexican American students who have competed in traditional studies will acquire economic and social skills that can be employed in advancing the overall Chicano movement.

A beginning objective in the plan for Chicano studies is the hiring of native, ethnic faculty members to become models for Chicano youth—that is, teachers with whom students can identify with pride. However, the limited number of Mexican

Americans with formal academic credentials has created an overload of responsibilities for the few who are available. To illustrate, on the eight campuses of the University of California are employed 5,730 assistant, associate, and full professors, of whom only 30 are Mexican American. Of these only 9 have tenure. At the untenured level of instructor, associate, and lecturer, there are 25 more Mexican Americans, making a total of 55 throughout the entire system (Rochin, 1972:6-7). Likewise, at the University of Texas at El Paso there are 314 assistant, associate, and full professors, of whom only 13 are Mexican American. Only 3 of 246 tenured members of that faculty are from the Spanish-surname group. An additional 8 Mexican Americans are a part of the group of 66 instructors on campus, mostly in specially funded programs. Yet the salary schedule and prestige of the University of Texas at El Paso, though the school claims nearly one-eighth of the total undergraduate Mexican American students in the United States in its student body, is insufficient to compete with UCLA, Notre Dame, Yale, or the University of Texas at Austin for Chicano faculty members. There is continuous pressure on departments and administrators to employ more Chicano professionals, but their scarcity puts them at a premium. When these demands force an institution to hire a Chicano poorly suited by way of background experience and credentials to replace a non-Chicano with superior qualifications, it is not unusual for the Chicano studies or related program to suffer in efficiency and planning what it gains in obtaining a Chicano "success model." When Chicanos are brought into the campus with little prior academic experience, they know little of the "rules of the game." Often their innovative (and sometimes unorthodox) methods cause administrative overreactions, and this constant bickering is a poor basis for establishing a lasting program. Moreover, in extreme cases, as a defensive reaction to Chicano program failures, other academic departments are assaulted with unwarranted accusations, often the very departments which pose a threat to the "totalitarian methods" of Chicano leaders because of the quality of professionalism exhibited therein.

At some institutions, radical activity and notoriety have brought direct repressive measures from regents and adminis-

trators, government agencies, and private foundations, resulting in a discontinuance of funds for Chicano projects. The first programs to be cut during the general tightening of the national economy were marginal, innovative ones. Although Chicano studies suffered because of these budgetary restrictions, the often overlooked result was that those which survived did so with a promising future under the direction of skilled Chicano professionals.

As stated above, the supply of Chicano academicians is extremely limited, and the drive to enlist Chicanos into Chicano studies majors leaves none for the traditional disciplines. Though current data do not furnish a complete answer to how many Chicano professions (especially those with the Ph.D. or its equivalent) are currently available, it is generally known that modern languages (especially Spanish), humanities, and the arts have a large representation of Spanish surnames, though many of these are European or South American rather than Mexican. In the various social sciences the Mexican Americans with doctorates are few indeed. Rochin (1972) claims that only three or four Chicanos in the United States have Ph.D.'s in economics, of which he is one. In the political science field, Carlos Muñoz of the University of California in Irvine surveyed 943 schools and reported a total of eight Chicanos with Ph.D.'s in that discipline. It is thought that there are about the same number of Chicano psychologists—though this is not certain. Although there are about two dozen Spanish-surname persons with Ph.D.'s in sociology, the Chicano Sociologist's Caucus at national meetings of sociologists claimed a core membership of fewer than a dozen, with decreasing activity by senior sociologists in radical policies. Spanish surnames are probably better represented in the professions of law, medicine, and dentistry, but as practitioners, not as teachers. Spanish-surname faculty members are fairly numerous in the various education departments of southwestern universities, no doubt partially a consequence of the former practice of filling the ranks with high school principals and school superintendents who have had practical experience.

Since the few available ethnic faculty members are spread so thinly, individual Chicano faculty members face major prob-

lems. According to Rochin (1972) and Estrada (1972), during the first year of university activity, the Chicano teacher must make a decision on priorities—whether Chicano interests or those of his discipline are to be paramount. Those who commit themselves to advancing the Chicano cause feel duty bound to work directly with ethnic students in an attempt to resolve their personal as well as their academic problems. School administrators will assign their few Chicano professionals to an abnormally large number of campus committees, sometimes to meet an "ethnic quota" and sometimes because they legitimately desire their ideas and input on committees concerned with sensitive campus policies. The professional Chicano has some responsibility to his discipline and his colleagues, but this may be dissipated by the constant demand for his personal support and assistance to Chicano students. If he is the titular head of a Chicano studies program, he is torn between attending formal ceremonies and accepting social invitations as a representative of his minority group while at the same time designing and developing new curricula suitable for achieving Chicano goals. It is not easy to become an overall expert in history, linguistics, education, political science, economics, sociology, and psychology and also to set up courses in these areas—particularly with the paucity of unbiased readings in each field. Further, some directors feel a compulsion to form a liaison with local barrio leaders, and this by itself becomes a highly demanding, sensitive operation. So, the Chicano teacher becomes more and more the scapegoat for failures; he is criticized by impatient, headstrong Chicano students, by disapproving colleagues, by vested interests that fear an upset in the status quo, and by the barrio leaders, who regard his middle-class life style as an Anglo sellout. It is little wonder that under the circumstances Chicano studies directors frequently succumb to these attacks and eventually return to their discipline.

OFF-CAMPUS CHICANO ACTIVITIES During the years from 1965 to 1969 many new barrio-based ethnic organizations emerged. These represented tenement dwellers seeking to protest arbitrary rent increases, homeowners uniting against zoning changes or devastating urban renewal plans, barrio-member

purchasing and credit cooperatives, legal aid groups, groups formed to seek improved community services or recreational facilities, mutual aid or relief societies, and those dedicated to educational reforms. Often begun by Vista, government social-action programs, or local churches, clubs, and brotherhoods, these barrio organizations would prosper when the leadership was finally assumed directly by local ethnic residents.

A major support for local barrio organizations has been direct or indirect financial support of private foundations and the federal government. In a recent directory of Spanish-speaking Community Organizations, one of the few national organizations listed is the Southwest Council of La Raza, presently with headquarters in Phoenix, Arizona. It was originally established by means of a large Ford Foundation grant and has since operated with supplementary funds from church and labor union contributions. Coordination of resources for the welfare of Mexican Americans is its primary aim. It works on target Anglo structures, locating or creating Chicano programs for betterment in a broad spectrum of content areas; in San Antonio and Oakland the Southwest Council has successfully provided legal protection for minority groups there. It is also attempting to create strong social bonds within the Mexican American barrios, especially when these are attacked through urban renewal, model cities, or urban rehabilitation programs. Its officials are aware that economic and social resources outside the immediate membership group itself must be tapped, various levels of power identified, and local programs for ethnic betterment unified politically (Cabrera, 1971:34-36). U.S. Representative H. B. Gonzalez in a recent report stated that a side effect of these grants is to equip local militant ethnic groups with the economic support to print materials that advocate violence, racism, hate, and fear, but pretend that they are building ethnic pride.

The direct involvement of Chicano social scientists in barrio affairs has created some hostility and stress within local barrios. Even former barrio residents who have achieved prominence within the larger society are viewed with suspicion. A Chicano professional who brings new ideas to the barrio thus pursues a dangerous course. He is vulnerable both to rejection

by Chicano residents and to repressive measures by local power figures if he is successful in organizing the barrio. Often, only by renouncing his position in the Establishment can he become fully accepted as a Chicano. At this point, he gains favor and support in the barrio but loses his influence among Anglo leaders.

These barrio-based operations have filled a need, and their effectiveness in creating a spirit of collective identity among Mexican Americans is well documented. For instance, in Chicago during the summer of 1966, after the Puerto Rican riot, the Latin American Defense Organization (LADO), led by Obed Gomez, was organized to protect Mexican Americans of that community from their neighbors. In San Antonio, the Mexican American Nationalist Organization (MANO), comprised of 300 exconvicts of Mexican descent and under the leadership of Alberto "Beto" Martinez, rallied together to curb police brutality on San Antonio's west side.

In Los Angeles the Brown Berets, under their youthful leader, David Sanchez, who dropped out of college to assume leadership of that organization, coordinated units of uniformed barrio youth—in the style of the Black Panthers. Their goals were spelled out by Carlos Montez, minister of public relations for the Brown Berets.

Gang fights are going out. We're getting kids from all the different gangs into the Brown Berets. It's going to be one big barrio, one big gang. We try to teach our people not to fight with each other, and not to fight with our blood brothers from the South [Torgerson, 1968:281].

Especially strong in lower-class barrios, the Brown Berets rejected Establishment programs such as OEO and the like. The organization claimed to restore and preserve the dignity of the Mexican Americans without violence, except in self-defense, although its selected activities were those in which police violence was anticipated. Operating principally in California, it now has small units in all major urban centers of the Southwest.

During the last few years of the confrontation era, activities of the militant arm of the Chicano movement were well publicized in the mass media, although the waning of ethnic inter-

est has been highly visible. A close investigation of many of these confrontations discloses varied reasons for their activism. It also lays bare the difficulties in maintaining peaceful internal goals with short-term planning while dealing with overreacting Establishment representatives. Take for instance some of the school boycotts that occurred during the years from 1968 to 1970.

In the spring of 1968, a school "blowout" (walkout) occurred in Los Angeles. A local ethnic organization, the Brown Berets, was accused of being instrumental in causing the school walkout. David Sanchez, the Brown Beret leader, saw the organization's function in minority protection, to intervene between the students and police in case of Establishment reaction to the protest. He stated:

We were at the walkout to protect our younger people. When they (the law officers) started hitting with sticks, we went in . . . put ourselves between the police and the kids, and took the beating [Torgerson, 1968:282].

Sanchez's claim was supported by a report of the Civil Rights Commission, prepared by the California State Advisory Committee in 1970. Investigators found that the demonstration had occurred in an orderly manner and that calm prevailed when police were absent. The people became ugly *only when police were present*. This grew out of a past history of disillusionment with the police as an effective, fair channel for gaining justice or redress for ethnic inequities. The walkout itself was the culmination of frustrations and bitterness festering over a period of time.

In retrospect, the Los Angeles walkout erupted prematurely and spontaneously, separate from the well-laid plans of student-protest groups. When students at Lincoln High approached a social science teacher, Sal Castro, about a blowout to protest lack of bicultural education opportunities, he told them to organize instead. With the aid of UMAS and nearby college personnel, blowout committees were established at each of the four east Los Angeles schools and coordinated through a central committee. Castro explains how their plans were preempted by spontaneous student reaction to school administrative decisions.

The original plan was to go before the Board of Education and propose a set of changes without walking out—to hold that back to get what they wanted. Then, at Wilson High Friday (March 1), the principal canceled a play they were going to do as unfit, and the Wilson kids blew out. It was spontaneous. Then Roosevelt and Lincoln wanted to blow, too. Garfield, too. Later on (March 8) Belmont, which was never in on the original plan, came in, too.

These blowouts in the other schools, like Venice and Jefferson, weren't connected with the Chicano blowouts, but they may have been in sympathy. Some of the kids from schools uptown asked us to send representatives to tell them how to organize. What do you think of that! The Anglo schools asking the Chicano kids to help them organize. They should've told them "Ask your dads how they organized to oppress us all these years" [Torgerson, 1968:283].

With this confrontation between an emotional, radical ethnic movement and a rigidly repressive society have come the multitude of news stories of riots and mass violence. Have these stories restored law and order or have they merely precipitated further violence? Following the Los Angeles walkout, Ralph Guzman of UCLA, observing the police efforts to subdue the overexuberant participants, remarked:

They've given these people a real revolutionary experience. No Marxist could do better. They're making rebels. When they see police clubbing them, it's the final evidence that society is against them—that existing within the system won't work [Torgerson, 1968:282].

During the Denver riots of 1969, police reacted similarly, and during that year in many metropolitan areas, cities, and towns, apathy and disgust turned into overt dissent, protest, and confrontation. As a result, student-led walkouts have continued to occur throughout the Southwest in recent times.

In Los Angeles, for example, there was still anger two years after the arrest and indictments by a grand jury of the thirteen participants in the Los Angeles school blowout of March 1968. Much of the smoldering distrust between the community and

the law had spread from teenagers to parents. Peaceful student demonstrations in the spring of 1970 were met with police force, student beatings, and jail, which again brought into question the function of the local police force (to protect the people or repress them?). The California State Advisory Committee reported in 1970 that following a publicly declared Chicano moratorium, various events occurred that created a further polarization. An east Los Angeles National Chicano Moratorium March of 7,000 Chicanos to protest United States' involvement in Vietnam and decry the high percentage of Mexican American battle casualties, led to a confrontation in the streets and at Laguna Park, where the crowd included Chicanos, Anglos, and blacks—adults, teenagers, and children. Bottles were thrown at police vehicles, tear gas was fired profusely, and violence finally resulted in some deaths, including that of the most eloquent Chicano spokesman of the Los Angeles press, Ruben Salazar. More than 400 demonstrators were jailed. Although this event was organized by Rosalio Muñoz, a former UCLA student-body president, and was endorsed by nearly all Mexican American organizations in the Southwest, its multipurposes (to protest the Chicano casualties in Vietnam, to promote a feeling of Chicano identity, and to protest police brutality) produced varied reactions toward what occurred that day.

Even though radicalism generally cooled throughout the Southwest after 1970, there were events occurring significant enough to suggest that the radical era of the movement was far from quieted. For instance, on June 13, 1971, at Albuquerque's Tijerina Park, a mixed group of hippies and Chicanos were checked by police for alleged drinking. Strong claims are made that police harassment was the underlying motive, but bottles and rocks thrown by park participants forced a call for reinforcements, and what had started out as a confrontation between police and park inhabitants became an ethnic confrontation. After a park rally the following Monday, sponsored by the Gorras Negras, at which the lieutenant governor and attorney general had agreed to speak, the hippies wished to continue the antipolice move, but Chicano leaders, sensing that their people would bear the major brunt of the ensuing battle,

attempted to make the people go home. Roving bands created disturbances on campus and downtown, and some 283 more persons were arrested. The barrio newspaper *Venceremos I* blamed the entire event on the police, but, obviously, the initial move to clear the park area provided the means to act out (on both sides) the underlying hostilities previously felt between the police and Chicanos.

Unless some positive measures are taken to increase the dialogue between the community, Anglos on the police force, and denizens of the barrio, Anglo and Mexican American blood will probably be spilled in the ghettos of Los Angeles, San Antonio, Houston, Flint, Oakland, Denver, and Albuquerque within the next few years. Police confrontations that are completely unrelated to ethnic problems will become violent, and when barrio reaction to police harassment runs high, it will provide the spark for interethnic violence, even though the events themselves are not initiated by ethnic hatred. Repressive police tactics and arrogance on the part of minority leaders who are attempting to "save face" provide fuel for riots, and with increasing tensions, totalitarian-type barrio leaders become ethnic spokesmen. Such conditions further increase the danger of open hostility and mob violence. Ignoring the problem in hopes that it will resolve itself will only allow the underlying frustrations and hostility to fester and gather momentum for these periodic outbreaks. In most cases, local police officers and many Chicano protestors are the pawns of both the dominant and minority leadership in their efforts to blame the other side for a very sensitive and uncomfortable interethnic situation.

THE PERIOD OF STRATEGIC PENETRATION (1970 TO THE PRESENT)

The events of the militant period just past have affected even the more traditional ethnic organizations. Gonzalez (1969: 188) reports that the LULAC membership in northern New Mexico have agreed to be included in the overall category of Mexican American rather than to try and maintain their isolation as Spanish Americans. The LULAC organization has

been accommodating to the more aggressive GI Forum, and it is cooperating in the sponsorship of SER, Inc. (Service-Employment-Redevelopment), to provide barrio-centered manpower retraining opportunities for needy Mexican Americans. But the extensive coordination of the various political, social, and cultural organizations representing the different Mexican American orientations just discussed in this chapter is the first requirement for success in a strategic penetration period. The first national La Raza Unida party convention in El Paso in August 1972, was a vivid demonstration of a focused penetration into the heretofore "untouchable" political arena.

Whereas in former years radical confrontations were instrumental in focusing attention on the severity of ethnic poverty and discrimination, these methods no longer create the same favorable public interest they once did. Even in the Chicano studies programs, which have suffered some reverses in recent years, the more realistic adaptations of those that survive indicate that the final phase of maturity for the Chicano movement has been reached. Once self-identity has been firmly established within the ethnic group itself and has been accepted to some degree by the dominant Anglo society, then penetration of dominant institutions can be effected, eventually leading to more considerations of Chicano interests.

There are presently two dominant orientations within the Chicano movement, one emphasizing pragmatism and the other ideology (Kennedy, 1972). The pragmatists sense the change in mood in America and feel that penetrating the existing institutional structures will yield the best results now. Their immediate goal is the placement of Chicano professionals in strategic political, economic, and educational positions, which will secure and validate Chicano gains and promote ethnic pride through achievement and competition in the larger society. This appears to be the strongest force in the Chicano movement today and is admirably suited to integrating the Chicano's desire for ethnic autonomy (i.e., self-identity) with his need for some outside help to solve his problems.

The ideological orientation is more of a romantic approach, typified by the creation of Aztlán. In practice, an Aztlán would have to function somewhat like England's royal family—as a

figurehead but without organized power. In any other sense, it is an unrealistic goal.

The humanist component of the ideological orientation seeks further development of Chicano art, music, poetry, and literature, and more nearly approximates the efforts of the pragmatists. However, the social scientists who seek an ideological solution to current Chicano problems are searching for alternatives to the institutions presently existing within American society. One Chicano spokesman warns that these alternate structures must not be just Chicano-dominated replications of existing Anglo institutions (Muñoz, 1970). As Sena Rivera put it:

Truly distinct approaches are needed to solve Chicano problems, not just models duplicating existing Anglo structures. Thus, a Chicano institution of higher education should not be one with Chicano President, Chicano Deans, Chicano Department Heads and Chicano Faculty but an original structure which truly represents the interests of the Chicano student [1972].

It is difficult to foresee what will be the outcome of the Chicano movement, because it, like everything else, is influenced by affairs outside its sphere of influence. This includes Vietnam, hostilities in the Middle East, national spending policies, and election trends. Also important is the way in which Mexican American leaders trained during the 1960s adapt to new strategies and tactics appropriate to the 1970s: whether they trigger further backlash reactions through rash confrontation and threats or coordinate and unify their constituency for penetration and manipulation of the system for long-range results.

CHICANISMO AND OTHER CONTEMPORARY MOVEMENTS

The Civil Rights Movement of the sixties initially appeared to be strongly allied to the Chicano cause. In order to publicly display the inequities suffered by Mexican Americans, Chicano

leaders needed a power base from which to demand changes. On the other hand the ethnic cause was a useful tool for Civil Rights leaders to initiate mass demonstrations that would have popular appeal. Some positive gains accrued in the short run from this relationship. However, once the plight of the minority had been exposed, the confrontation tactics required a follow-up plan of strategy to secure further gains. Since radical protest leaders maintain their power position only within a milieu of tension, race polarization, and social ferment, when these leaders could no longer use the ethnic issue to generate dissent, ethnic concerns were replaced by other sensational appeals. When reform-minded ethnic leaders suggested reducing tension through cooperative efforts with external agencies, the power base of the radical protest movement was threatened, and radical leadership had to decide whether to forego ethnic support or undermine the traditional ethnic leadership. Choosing the latter, they accomplished their goal by labeling moderate Chicanos as ethnic sellouts, or *malinches*.

These same radical protest leaders made use of certain functionaries within the dominant society whose rigidity, fear of losing power, and general overreaction to radical tactics gained much sympathetic support for protest groups. In such cases, protest leaders became self-appointed spokesmen for the Mexican American minority, and their charges of "Establishment repression" were subsequently taken up by educators, welfare workers, police officers, politicians, and others in reaction to strong confrontation tactics. As Moore correctly notes:

In recent years it has become plain that the fate of America's distinctive groups depended upon the reaction of American institutions more so than upon any institutions the group may have generated within itself [1970a: 96].

Ethnic nationalism was another approach to gaining a higher living standard for Mexican Americans. Radical Chicanos, using the Black Power movement as their model, formed Brown Power organizations. It was supposed that if the efforts of the two disenfranchised minorities were coordinated, each would have a better chance to break down ethnic barriers. As the years

went by, hindsight showed that a common distaste for Anglo-dominated institutions and ethnic stereotypes was not a strong enough bond to overcome the vastly different objectives and areas of major concern among Blacks and Chicanos. For instance, English is the native language of American Blacks, and they are never questioned about their United States citizenship. What they seek is to restore their multicultural heritage, which was lost during the decades of slavery. The Chicano, on the other hand, has not really lost his Mexican heritage, but must fight the "foreigner" label and the discriminatory results of having Spanish, not English, as his mother tongue. As benefits from the coalition between the two movements accrued disproportionately to blacks, Brown Power support weakened. As so often happens, minority members were more negatively oriented toward other minorities than were members of the majority group.

Tijerina and Gonzalez, with leaders of the 20,000 member Mexican-American Political Association (MAPA), are the architects of a coalition with militant black organizations of the West Coast. Presumably there is a united front made up of their three Mexican-American organizations and chapters of CORE, SNCC, and other black militants . . . the coalition is at times more verbal than actual, more mutually protective than jointly decisive, more crisis-oriented than comprehensively strategic. The Black and Mexican-American rank and file consider the arrangement a tactical necessity for situations of special duress. . . . The fact of the matter is that Blacks and Mexican-Americans barely know each other [Lara-Braud, 1970: 13].

There is a tendency by some to view ethnic dissent as unjustifiable disruption of a "good system," fomented by agitators paid to carry out the goals of the "Communist conspiracy." Such ridiculous stereotyping places the stigma of illegitimacy on the actions of a minority that is attempting to gain that legal, social, and economic equality of opportunity supposedly guaranteed to all Americans. After patiently tolerating decades of benign neglect, sheer desperation has forced this group to adopt radical methods of making its grievances known. But these actions, rather than being perceived as legitimate displays

of ethnic indignation, are regarded by Anglo reactionaries as a carefully contrived, pernicious scheme fostered by a few dedicated, Communist-inspired revolutionaries. These actions may be unlawful or deleterious to society, but those criteria hardly constitute a solid case for labeling them Communist.

The John Birch Society in New Mexico had already effectively used the label "Communist" to smear the Alianza movement. This process was far less effective, however, against the Brown Berets during the Los Angeles school walkout. Carlos Montez, minister of the Brown Berets (whose uniforms resemble that of the late Ché Guevara but whose ideology is quite dissimilar), refuted this charge in the following statement:

Communism? That's a white thing. . . . It's pretty hard to mix Communists and Mexican-Americans. Ché [Ché Guevara] doesn't mean a thing to the guy in the street. He's got his own problems [Torgerson, 1968:281].

To be anti-Establishment does not automatically make one pro-Communist. This is an essential point often missed by Anglo leaders, who feel threatened by those questioning the fairness of certain practices in our present society.

Occasional hippie support for minority issues on college campuses has caused some observers to assume these groups have a perspective in common with protesting ethnic groups. However, Chicano leaders have openly ridiculed the "do-your-own-thing" doctrine as damaging to the Chicano movement. To establish effective solidarity and self-identity as La Raza Nueva demands ethnic loyalty and unity, not individualistic, sometimes aberrant behavior.

Even the peace movement has become linked with the drive for Mexican American autonomy. In El Paso, Chicanos had the full support of the peace movement liberals until the fall of 1970, when, during an organized rally to protest the war, Chicano leaders introduced local demands that diluted, it was felt, the impact of the mobilization rally. Since that event, campus Chicanos have never been able to get the same level of unqualified and sustained support from that source.

The Chicano movement exemplifies the potential force within Mexican American society to improve itself and its position in

the larger society. While many of the protests have been born of emotional desperation, and the revolts have been short-lived, the movement demonstrates that the people are eager to gain quality and justice—and the image of a lazy, complacent, humiliated people without pride or leadership has been effectively destroyed.

The decreasing emphasis on anti-Establishment rhetoric is not an indication that Chicanismo is dying, but rather an indication that Mexican Americans have firmly established a positive group identity and no longer feel threatened by stereotypes. This shift in strategy from the short-run gains of the activist period to a long-range strategy of consolidating these gains for future, viable planning, indicates the maturity and leadership potential within the movement. Without losing the ultimate objective of ethnic pride and autonomy, the Chicano movement has adopted a strategy consistent with its environment and with its stage of development. It remains to be seen whether this present thrust of Chicanismo can provide enough visible evidence of progress to prevent its radical elements from again assuming leadership of the movement.

Notes

- ¹ Two Mexican American scholars, Alvarez (1971:24–25) and Cuellar (1970) have used cultural eras and political periods to describe the changing shift from ethnic dependency to ethnic autonomy. However, their analyses explicitly select the 1848 period of "Anglo invasion" of the Southwest as *the single factor* that led to present-day Mexican American political and economic impotency, a highly questionable assumption.
- ² Though this factionalism centered on an organization's name, it was symbolic of differences in historical development in the area (Moore, 1970b) and the degree of ethnic autonomy demanded.
- ³ Most prominent among Mexican American leaders of the organized protest era, excluding the three mentioned, is José Angel Guttierrez. His dynamic leadership was a crucial factor in obtaining the election victories in Crystal City, Texas, thus demonstrating the ballot box as a legitimate alternative to Chicano power. From that localized beginning, a viable political organiza-

tion, La Raza Unida, has emerged, which held its first national convention in El Paso, Texas, in August 1972. The Texas governorship is the only statewide office for which La Raza Unida has furnished a party office seeker—Ramsey Munez. Guittierez was selected as the first La Raza Unida party chairman, over Corky Gonzales of Denver, and can legitimately be counted as one of the more important ethnic leaders of the emerging strategic penetration era.

David Sanchez, leader of the Brown Berets, is symbolic of the early Chicano militancy. Although he is prominently displayed, he has steadily lost power and support to less radical leaders within the Chicano movement. Bert Corono, head of MAPA, was a driving force in politicizing the Mexican Americans of West Coast states, principally California. His pioneering efforts and support for Guittierez and others have demonstrated his early contribution to organization and coordination of Mexican American groups in the political arena.

The late Ruben Salazar, the "Voice of La Causa" in Los Angeles, is another significant name during that period.

⁴ Gonzales' "spiritual plan for Aztlán" was a dream of Chicano unity and power, a hope of regaining the glories of the past. However, as Moore comments: "Whatever the sentimental attractions of a completely separate community, such a community never has actually worked. . . . But the romantic ideal of the separate community persists perhaps only because it is romantic, and simple [1970a:96]."

Chapter 8 © Joiners and Clients: Mexican Americans and Formal Organizations

The lack of involvement in organizations—both bureaucratic and less formal, voluntary types—on the part of Mexican Americans has been attributed entirely to their ethnic background. Actually, many factors such as generation, place of residence, and social-class levels, as well as external barriers of racial and religious intolerance contribute heavily to the situation.

PARTICIPATION IN BUREAUCRATIC STRUCTURES

Mexican immigrants come from the lower socioeconomic strata and have had little experience participating in formal organizations in their native land. Moreover, political and social structures in Mexico differ markedly from those in the United States. Cárdenas (1963) outlines the dependent power arrangement of the Mexican municipio, which acts as an extended organ of the state political structure through the relationship between the local mayor and the governor. The state power structure is likewise tied to the national government through the relationship between the governor and the president. D'Antonio and Form (1965) compared power structures in Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua, and El Paso, Texas, and found the Mexican structure to be more monolithic and centrally controlled than the one in the United States. No successful civic program is initiated or legitimized in Mexico without support from higher authorities through personal channels of power. In this coun-

'Men Have Forgotten' God

This article is adapted from the address Mr. Solzhenitsyn gave on the occasion of his acceptance, in London on May 10, of this year's Templeton Prize for Progress in Religion. The first winner of the Templeton Prize, in 1972, was Mother Teresa; last year's winner was the Reverend Billy Graham. In announcing the 1983 award, the Templeton Foundation described Mr. Solzhenitsyn as "a pioneer in the renaissance of religion in atheist nations." Mr. Solzhenitsyn's introductory remarks were made at the awards ceremony at Buckingham Palace, with Prince Philip presiding. The address proper was delivered later the same day at the London Guildhall.

I. The Response

Your Royal Highness: Permit me to express my appreciation to you for taking part in this ceremony. Your participation lends special dignity to these proceedings.

This is the first time that the Templeton Prize has been awarded to an Orthodox Christian. With gratitude that our share in the religious life of the world has now been accorded notice, I remain acutely conscious of my personal unworthiness to receive this award as I look back upon the venerable line of outstanding Orthodox churchmen and of Orthodox thinkers from Aleksei Khomyakov to Sergei Bulgakov. And I am very much aware that Eastern Slavic Orthodoxy, which, during the 65 years of Communist rule, has been subjected to persecution even fiercer and more extensive than that of early Christian times, has had—and still has today—many hands worthier than mine to accept it. Beginning with Vladimir Bogoyavlensky, metropolitan of Kiev, shot by the Communists before the walls of the Kiev-Pechersky Monastery at the dawn of the Lenin era, the list would extend to the intrepid priest Gleb Yakunin, who is enduring torments today, under Andropov: Forcibly deprived of all outward symbols of his priesthood, and even of the right to have the Gospels, Father Yakunin has for months at a time been held in a freezing stone cubicle, without bed, clothes, or food.

In this persecution-filled age, it is appropriate that my own very first memory should be of Chekists in pointed

caps entering St. Panteleimon's Church in Kislovodsk, interrupting the service, and crashing their way into the sanctuary in order to loot. And later, when I started going to school in Rostov-on-Don—passing on my way a kilometer-long compound of the Cheka-GPU and a glittering sign of the League of Militant Atheists—schoolchildren egged on by Komsomol members taunted me for accompanying my mother to the last remaining church in town and tore the cross from around my neck.

Orthodox churches were stripped of their valuables in 1922 at the instigation of Lenin and Trotsky. In subsequent years, including both the Stalin and the Khrushchev periods, tens of thousands of churches were torn down or desecrated, leaving behind a disfigured wasteland that bore no resemblance to Russia such as it had stood for centuries. Entire districts and cities of half a million inhabitants were left without a single church. Our people were condemned to live in this dark and mute wilderness for decades, groping their way to God and keeping to this course by trial and error. The grip of oppression that we have lived under, and continue to live under, has been so great that religion, instead of leading to a free blossoming of the spirit, has been manifested in asserting the faith on the brink of destruction, or else on the seductive frontiers of Marxist rhetoric, where so many souls have come to grief.

The statement of the Templeton Foundation shows an understanding of how the Orthodox spiritual tradition has maintained its vitality in our land despite the forcible promotion of atheism. If even a fraction of those words should find their way to my motherland past the jamming devices, this will bolster the spirits of our believers, assuring them that they have not been forgotten, and that their steadfastness inspires courage even here.

The centralized atheism before whose armed might the whole world trembles still hates and fears this unarmed faith as much today as it did sixty years ago. Yes! All the savage persecutions loosed upon our people by a murderous state atheism, coupled with the corroding effect of its

*World copyright © 1983 by Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn.
Translator: A. Klimoff.*

es, and an avalanche of stultifying propaganda—all of less together have proven weaker than the thousand-year-old faith of our nation. This faith has not been destroyed; remains the most sublime, the most cherished gift to which our lives and consciousness can attain.

I. The Templeton Address

More than half a century ago, while I was still a child, I recall hearing a number of older people offer the following explanation for the great disasters that had befallen Russia: "Men have forgotten God; that's why all this has happened."

Since then I have spent well-nigh fifty years working on the history of our Revolution; in the process I have read hundreds of books, collected hundreds of personal testimonies, and have already contributed eight volumes of my own toward the effort of clearing away the rubble left by that upheaval. But if I were asked today to formulate as concisely as possible the main cause of the ruinous Revolution that swallowed up some sixty million of our people, I could not put it more accurately than to repeat: "Men have forgotten God; that's why all this has happened."


What is more, the events of the Russian Revolution can only be understood now, at the end of the century, against the background of what has since occurred in the rest of the world. What emerges here is a process of universal significance. And if I were called upon to identify briefly the principal trait of the *entire* twentieth century, here too I would be unable to find anything more precise and pithy than to repeat once again: "Men have forgotten God." The failings of human consciousness, deprived of its divine dimension, have been a determining factor in all the major crimes of this century. The first of these was World War I, and much of our present predicament can be traced back to it. That war (the memory of which seems to be fading) took place when Europe, bursting with health and abundance, fell into a rage of self-mutilation that could not but

sap its strength for a century or more, and perhaps forever. The only possible explanation for this war is a mental eclipse among the leaders of Europe due to their lost awareness of a Supreme Power above them. Only a godless embitterment could have moved ostensibly Christian states to employ poison gas, a weapon so obviously beyond the limits of humanity.

The same kind of defect, the flaw of a consciousness lacking all divine dimension, was manifested after World War II when the West yielded to the satanic temptation of the nuclear umbrella. It was equivalent to saying: Let's cast off our worries, let's free the younger generation from its duties and obligations, let's make no effort to defend ourselves, to say nothing of defending others—let's stop our ears to the groans emanating from the East, and let us live instead in the pursuit of happiness. If danger should threaten us, we shall be protected by the nuclear bomb; if not, then let the world be burned in Hell for all we care. The pitifully helpless state to which the contemporary West has sunk is in large measure due to this fatal error: the belief that the defense of peace depends not on stout hearts and steadfast men, but solely on the nuclear bomb.

Only the loss of that higher intuition which comes from God could have allowed the West to accept calmly, after World War I, the protracted agony of Russia as she was being torn apart by a band of cannibals, or to accept, after World War II, the similar dismemberment of Eastern Europe. The West did not perceive that this was in fact the beginning of a lengthy process that spells disaster for the whole world; indeed the West has done a good deal to help the process along. Only once in this century did the West gather its strength—for the battle against Hitler. But the fruits of that victory have long since been lost. Faced with cannibalism, our godless age has discovered the perfect anaesthetic—trade! Such is the pathetic pinnacle of contemporary wisdom.

Today's world has reached a stage that, if it had been described to preceding centuries, would have called forth the cry: "This is the Apocalypse!"



Yet we have grown used to this kind of world; we even feel at home in it.

Dostoevsky warned that "great events could come upon us and catch us intellectually unprepared." That is precisely what has happened. And he predicted that "the world will be saved only after a visitation by the demon of evil." Whether it really will be saved we shall have to wait and see; this will depend on our conscience, on our spiritual lucidity, on our individual and combined efforts in the face of catastrophic circumstances. But it has already come to pass that the demon of evil, like a whirlwind, triumphantly circles all five continents of the earth.

We are witnesses to the devastation of the world, be it imposed or voluntarily undergone. The entire twentieth century is being sucked into the vortex of atheism and self-destruction. This plunge into the abyss has aspects that are unquestionably global, dependent neither on political systems, nor on levels of economic and cultural development, nor yet on national peculiarities. And present-day Europe, seemingly so unlike the Russia of 1913, is today on the verge of the same collapse, for all that it has been reached by a different route. Different parts of the world have followed different paths, but today they are all approaching the threshold of a common ruin.

In its past, Russia did know a time when the social ideal was not fame, or riches, or material success, but a pious way of life. Russia was then steeped in an Orthodox Christianity that remained true to the Church of the first centuries. The Orthodoxy of that time knew how to safeguard its people under the yoke of a foreign occupation that lasted more than two centuries, while at the same time fending off iniquitous blows from the swords of Western crusaders. During those centuries the Orthodox faith in our country became part of the very patterns of thought and the personality of our people, the forms of daily life, the work calendar, the priorities in every undertaking, the organization of the week and of the year. Faith was the shaping and unifying force of the nation.

But in the seventeenth century Russian Orthodoxy was gravely weakened by an internal schism. In the eighteenth, the country was shaken by Peter's forcibly imposed transformations, which favored the economy, the state, and the military at the expense of the religious spirit and national life. And along with this lopsided Petrine enlightenment, Russia felt the first whiff of secularism; its subtle poisons permeated the educated classes in the course of the nineteenth century and opened the path to Marxism. By the time of the Revolution, faith had virtually disappeared in Russian educated circles; among the uneducated, too, faith had declined.

It was Dostoevsky, once again, who drew from the French Revolution and its seething hatred of the Church the lesson that "revolution must necessarily begin with atheism." That is absolutely true. But the world had never before known a godlessness as organized, militarized, and tenaciously malevolent as that practiced by Marxism. Within the philosophical system of Marx and Lenin, and at the heart of their psychology, hatred of God is the principal driving force, more fundamental than all their political and economic pretensions. Militant atheism is not merely incidental or marginal to Communist policy; it is not a side effect, but the central pivot. To achieve its diabolical ends, Communism needs to control a population devoid of religious and na-

tional feeling, and this entails the destruction of faith and nationhood. Communists proclaim both of these objectives openly, and just as openly go about carrying them out. The degree to which the atheistic world longs to annihilate religion, the extent to which religion sticks in its throat, was demonstrated by the web of intrigue surrounding the recent attempts on the life of the Pope.

The 1920s in the USSR witnessed an uninterrupted pro-

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cession of victims and martyrs among the Orthodox clergy. Two metropolitans were shot, one of whom, Veniamin of Petrograd, had been elected by the popular vote of his diocese. Patriarch Tikhon himself passed through the hands of the Cheka-GPU and then died under suspicious circumstances. Scores of archbishops and bishops perished. Tens of thousands of priests, monks, and nuns, pressured by the Chekists to renounce the word of God, were tortured, shot in cellars, sent to camps, exiled to the desolate tundra of the far north, or turned out into the streets in their old age without food or shelter. All these Christian martyrs went unswervingly to their deaths for the faith; instances of apostasy were few and far between.

For tens of millions of laymen access to the Church was blocked, and they were forbidden to bring up their children in the faith: religious parents were wrenched from their children and thrown into prison, while the children were turned from the faith by threats and lies. One could argue that the pointless destruction of Russia's rural economy in the 1930s—the so-called de-kulakization and collectivization, which brought death to 15 million peasants while making no economic sense at all—was enforced with such cruelty, first and foremost, for the purpose of destroying our national way of life and of extirpating religion from the countryside. The same policy of spiritual perversion operated throughout the brutal world of the Gulag Archipelago, where men were encouraged to survive at the cost of the lives of others. And only atheists bereft of reason could have decided upon the ultimate brutality—against the Russian land itself—that is being planned in the USSR today: The Russian north is to be flooded, the flow of the northern rivers reversed, the life of the Arctic Ocean disrupted, and the water channeled southward, toward lands already devastated by earlier, equally foolhardy "feats of Communist construction."

For a short period of time, when he needed to gather strength for the struggle against Hitler, Stalin cynically adopted a friendly posture toward the Church. This deceptive game, continued in later years by Brezhnev with the help of showcase publications and other window dressing,

has unfortunately tended to be taken at face value in the West. Yet the tenacity with which hatred of religion is rooted in Communism may be judged by the example of its most liberal leader, Khrushchev: for though he undertook a number of significant steps to extend freedom, Khrushchev simultaneously rekindled the frenzied Leninist obsession with destroying religion.

But there is something they did not expect: that in a land where churches have been leveled, where a triumphant atheism has rampaged uncontrolled for two-thirds of a century, where the clergy is utterly humiliated and deprived of all independence, where what remains of the Church as an institution is tolerated only for the sake of propaganda directed at the West, where even today people are sent to labor camps for their faith and where, within the camps themselves, those who gather to pray at Easter are clapped in punishment cells—they could not suppose that beneath this Communist steamroller the Christian tradition would survive in Russia. It is true that millions of our countrymen have been corrupted and spiritually devastated by an officially imposed atheism, yet there remain many millions of believers: it is only external pressures that keep them from speaking out, but, as is always the case in times of persecution and suffering, the awareness of God in my country has attained great acuteness and profundity.

It is here that we see the dawn of hope: for no matter how formidably Communism bristles with tanks and rockets, no matter what successes it attains in seizing the planet, it is doomed never to vanquish Christianity.

The West has yet to experience a Communist invasion; religion here remains free. But the West's own historical evolution has been such that today it too is experiencing a drying up of religious consciousness. It too has witnessed racking schisms, bloody religious wars, and rancor, to say nothing of the tide of secularism that, from the late Middle Ages onward, has progressively inundated the West. This gradual sapping of strength from within is a threat to faith that is perhaps even more dangerous than any attempt to assault religion violently from without.


Imperceptibly, through decades of gradual erosion, the meaning of life in the West has ceased to be seen as anything more lofty than the "pursuit of happiness," a goal that has even been solemnly guaranteed by constitutions. The con-

cepts of good and evil have been ridiculed for several centuries; banished from common use, they have been replaced by political or class considerations of short-lived value. It has become embarrassing to appeal to eternal concepts, embarrassing to state that evil makes its home in the individual human heart before it enters a political system. Yet it is not considered shameful to make daily concessions to an integral evil. Judging by the continuing landslide of concessions made before the eyes of our own generation alone, the West is ineluctably slipping toward the abyss. Western societies are losing more and more of their religious essence as they thoughtlessly yield up their younger generation to atheism. If a blasphemous film about Jesus is shown throughout the United States, reputedly one of the most religious countries in the world, or a major newspaper publishes a shameless caricature of the Virgin Mary, what further evidence of godlessness does one need? When external rights are completely unrestricted, why should one make an inner effort to restrain oneself from ignoble acts?

Or why should one refrain from burning hatred, whatever its basis—race, class, or ideology? Such hatred is in fact corroding many hearts today. Atheist teachers in the West are bringing up a younger generation in a spirit of hatred of their own society. Amid all the vituperation we forget that the defects of capitalism represent the basic flaws of human nature, allowed unlimited freedom together with the various human rights; we forget that under Communism (and Communism is breathing down the neck of all moderate forms of socialism, which are unstable) the identical flaws run riot in any person with the least degree of authority; while everyone else under that system does indeed attain "equality"—the equality of destitute slaves.

This eager fanning of the flames of hatred is becoming the mark of today's free world. Indeed, the broader the personal freedoms are, the higher the level of prosperity or even of abundance—the more vehement, paradoxically, does this blind hatred become. The contemporary developed West thus demonstrates by its own example that human salvation can be found neither in the profusion of material goods nor in merely making money.

This deliberately nurtured hatred then spreads to all that is alive, to life itself, to the world with its colors, sounds, and shapes, to the human body. The embittered art of the



twentieth century is perishing as a result of this ugly hate, for art is fruitless without love. In the East art has collapsed because it has been knocked down and trampled upon, but in the West the fall has been voluntary, a decline into a contrived and pretentious quest where the artist, instead of attempting to reveal the divine plan, tries to put himself in the place of God.

Here again we witness the single outcome of a worldwide process, with East and West yielding the same results, and once again for the same reason: Men have forgotten God.

Confronted by the onslaught of worldwide atheism, believers are disunited and frequently bewildered. And yet the Christian (or post-Christian) world would do well to note the example of the Far East. I have recently had an

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opportunity to observe in Free China and in Japan how, despite their apparently less clearly defined religious concepts, and despite the same unassailable "freedom of choice" that exists in the West, both the younger generation and society as a whole have preserved their moral sensibility to a greater degree than the West has, and have been less affected by the destructive spirit of secularism.

What can one say about the lack of unity among the various religions, if Christianity has itself become so fragmented? In recent years the major Christian churches have taken steps toward reconciliation. But these measures are far too slow; the world is perishing a hundred times more quickly. No one expects the churches to merge or to revise all their doctrines, but only to present a common front against atheism. Yet even for such a purpose the steps taken are much too slow.

There does exist an organized movement for the unification of the churches, but it presents an odd picture. The World Council of Churches seems to care more for the success of revolutionary movements in the Third World, all the while remaining blind and deaf to the persecution of religion where this is carried through most consistently—in the USSR. No one can fail to see the facts; must one conclude, then, that it is deemed expedient not to see, not to get involved? But if that is the case, what remains of Christianity?

It is with profound regret that I must note here something which I cannot pass over in silence. My predecessor in the receipt of this prize last year—in the very month that the award was made—lent public support to Communist lies by his deplorable statement that he had not noticed the persecution of religion in the USSR. Before the multitude of those who have perished and who are oppressed today, may God be his judge.

It seems more and more apparent that even with the most sophisticated of political maneuvers, the noose around the neck of mankind draws tighter and more hopeless with every passing decade, and there seems to be no way out for anyone—neither nuclear, nor political, nor economic, nor ecological. That is indeed the way things appear to be.

With such global events looming over us like mountains, nay, like entire mountain ranges, it may seem incongruous and inappropriate to recall that the primary key to our being or non-being resides in each individual human heart, in the heart's preference for specific good or evil. Yet this remains true even today, and it is, in fact, the most reliable key we have. The social theories that promised so much have demonstrated their bankruptcy, leaving us at a dead end. The free people of the West could reasonably have been expected to realize that they are beset by numerous freely nurtured falsehoods, and not to allow lies to be foisted upon them so easily. All attempts to find a way out of the plight of today's world are fruitless unless we redirect our consciousness, in repentance, to the Creator of all: without this, no exit will be illumined, and we shall seek it in vain. The resources we have set aside for ourselves are too impoverished for the task. We must first recognize the horror perpetrated not by some outside force, not by class or national enemies, but within each of us individually, and within every society. This is especially true of a free and highly developed society, for here in particular we have surely brought everything upon ourselves, of our own free will. We ourselves, in our daily unthinking selfishness, are pulling tight that noose.

Let us ask ourselves: Are not the ideals of our century false? And is not our glib and fashionable terminology just as unsound, a terminology that offers superficial remedies for every difficulty? Each of them, in whatever sphere, must be subjected to a clear-eyed scrutiny while there is still time. The solution of the crisis will not be found along the well-trodden paths of conventional thinking.

Our life consists not in the pursuit of material success but in the quest for worthy spiritual growth. Our entire earthly existence is but a transitional stage in the movement toward something higher, one rung of the ladder. Material laws alone do not explain our life or give it direction. The laws of physics and physiology will never reveal the indisputable manner in which the Creator constantly, day in and day out, participates in the life of each of us, unfailingly granting us the energy of existence; when this assistance leaves us, we die. And in the life of our entire planet the Divine Spirit surely moves with no less force: this we must grasp in our dark and terrible hour.

To the ill-considered hopes of the last two centuries, which have reduced us to insignificance and brought us to the brink of nuclear and non-nuclear death, we can propose only a determined quest for the warm hand of God, which we have so rashly and self-confidently spurned. Only in this way can our eyes be opened to the errors of this unfortunate twentieth century and our hands be directed to setting them right. There is nothing else to cling to in the landslide: the combined vision of all the thinkers of the Enlightenment amounts to nothing.

Our five continents are caught in a whirlwind. But it is during trials such as these that the highest gifts of the human spirit are manifested. If we perish and lose this world, the fault will be ours alone. □



DO IT UP BROWN!
PATY NEWMAN
Viewpoint Books
San Diego CA
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† THE HELPERS †

238

† THE HELPERS †

As is true in any movement of recent years, many groups and organizations flare up, make noise and then invariably give way to new groups of slightly different hues and cries. This is especially true with the younger groups, particularly on campus. But in the past year or so, the Chicano-oriented organizations have been going along with the united theme of La Raza and there has been an effort to coordinate these student and younger militant groups under one banner (La Raza) and one goal (El Plan de Aztlan). Group names still change, but even that is slowing down. For example, MECHA (Movimiento Estudiantil Chicano de Aztlan — the Aztlan Chicano Student Movement) is replacing many of the former Mexican American organizations on campus. Corky Gonzales' Crusade for Justice has been a great force in this unifying effort and his yearly National Chicano Youth Liberation Convention is his best tool.

Of course there are the older, more established Mexican American organizations, some hanging on with no really active support in these days of increased militancy, and some increasingly capitulating to the more aggressive actions of the young. But, as Corky Gonzales said, the whole Chicano

239

movement will be based on the "actions of the young, and the support of the old."¹

I can but barely touch in this book on the tremendous involvement of various governmental, tax-supported agencies in the Chicano revolutionary scene (the OEO's War on Poverty involvement would be a book by itself). It must suffice to simply say that the involvement is tremendous, expensive, and generally non-quieting.

For example, the March, 1970, report of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights entitled, "Mexican Americans and the Administration of Justice in the Southwest,"² although undoubtedly meaning well, is nevertheless practically nothing but reprints from the militant Chicano papers and a redigestion of the words of the militant Chicano leaders. Basically only one side of a serious problem is presented.

The government's Cabinet Committee on Opportunity for the Spanish Speaking published a "Directory of Spanish Speaking Community Organizations"³ which is roughly an 8 x 10, 220 page directory, free for the asking. I anticipated its arrival because I knew it would be a great deal of help to me in coordinating the various organizations, their addresses and their leaders. The only trouble was that all 220

¹*Combat*, a National Review publication, New York, March 15, 1970.

²*Mexican Americans and the Administration of Justice in the Southwest*, a Report of the United States Commission on Civil Rights, March, 1970. (For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., \$1.25.)

³*Directory of Spanish Speaking Community Organizations*. Cabinet Committee on Opportunity for the Spanish Speaking, Washington, D.C., June, 1970.

pages were filled with organizations that, for the most part, neither I nor any Chicano or Mexican American I know, had ever heard of. For example, there was no listing of Reies Tijerina's Alianza, no listing of Corky Gonzales' Crusade for Justice, and no listing for Cesar Chavez's UFWOC. Perhaps the Cabinet Committee didn't consider Tijerina, Gonzales or Chavez important leaders of the Spanish-speaking community, or in all fairness, perhaps these Chicano leaders didn't feel the Cabinet Committee important enough to bother filling out the forms sent to them (assuming forms were sent). Regardless, the telephone-sized directory is hardly an accurate picture of the more active and participatory organizations in the nation.

It is regretful that I have not been able to spend more time in this book on the all-important aspect of art in the Chicano movement, for certainly the various theatrical groups, artists' cooperatives, and publication associations are of prime importance in the Movement. Part of the rich Mexican culture is a natural love of music, poetry and art. Using these means of communication, the Chicano Movement emphasizes all three for its revolutionary purposes — a fact which can easily be verified by picking up any Chicano publication, attending any Chicano theatrical production, or looking at any of the multitude of Chicano posters generously plastered on most campuses and anywhere else possible.

The farm workers (Cesar Chavez's UFWOC) have their El Teatro Campesino under the direction of militant activist, Luis Valdez (see page 138). According to the *Los Angeles Times*: "Starting as an offshoot of the Chavez farm workers' movement and now autonomous and in its fifth year of operation, the bilingual Campesino continues

to vindicate Chicano causes through the use of some of the most original songs and most inventive pantomime and slapstick available anywhere. Raw, yes — but real, vital, far from primitive.”⁴ (I always wonder if the media *really* understands the *Chicano* “cause.”) The *Los Angeles Free Press* writes of El Teatro: “The performance has an energy unified by the trinity of ‘la causa, la huelga, la raza,’ . . . Each performance is a special dynamo in which Luis Valdez plucks away at the audience before each ‘acto,’ telling us about the nation of Aztlan . . . El Teatro exists in order to be as direct as possible, and all the aspects of its work serve that assumption.”⁵ (With *that*, I agree!) El Teatro now has a permanent home in San Juan Bautista in California and is without question one of the most powerful voices for Cesar Chavez, La Causa, and El Plan de Aztlan.

Poetry is perhaps the most popular individual expression within the movement. *Everyone* is writing poetry, including the Chicanos in prison. Some of it is good; most of it is not; but all of it is accepted and read. “Art,” defined by Corky Gonzales, is the “spirit of the revolution.” My overall impression of much of the artistic expressions in the Movement is certainly that their art is about the Chicano — Basta Ya! La Huelga! Viva La Revolución! — but is the Chicano Movement necessarily art? Some of the technique is very good. A great deal of it simply is not art, but merely an unsuccessful and undisciplined attempt to express a feeling — sincere, perhaps, but not art.

I also regret that I have not expanded upon the “stereotyped Mexican” as used in advertizing. The Chicanos are most upset about this. According to them: The Frito Ban-

⁴*Los Angeles Times*, Oct. 27, 1970.

⁵*Los Angeles Free Press*, Nov. 20, 1970, p. 43.

dito “implies that Mexicans are sneaky thieves”; the Gran-ny Goose ad depicts a fat Mexican toting guns and ammunition which implies that “Mexicans are overweight and carry deadly weapons”; a Leggett & Meyers ad says that “Paco never ‘feenishes’ anything, not even a revolution,” which implies that Mexicans are “too lazy to improve themselves”; a General Motors ad shows a white rustic man holding three Mexicans at gunpoint, which implies that “Mexicans should be and can be arrested by the superior white man”; an Arrid ad shows a Mexican bandido spraying under his arms with a voice saying, “If it works for him, it will work for you,” which obviously means that “Mexicans stink the most.”⁶

Where, oh where, has gone the world-famous Mexican sense of humor? True, some ads are in questionable taste, but there *is* a limit to this racial sensitivity scene.

There are, of course, dozens of other areas which space limits my covering, so at this point — on to the organizational “helpers.”

One of the earliest efforts to coordinate and politicalize the Mexican American communities came under the tutelage of Fred Ross, the professional, Saul Alinsky-trained organizer. In the early forties Fred Ross and Ignacio Lopez helped found the first in a series of Mexican American Unity Leagues. In Chino, California, Ross used his Alinsky technique of manipulating-into-a-crisis a particular issue (in this case, the fact that there was no Mexican representation on the city’s council) and thus captured the attention of the entire Mexican community. “This same organizing tactic was also employed by Fred Ross in his subsequent efforts to

⁶“Boycott Top Ten,” distributed by MAPA at the University of Texas at El Paso, Spring, 1970.

establish Unity Leagues in San Bernardino and Riverside, California . . . In both cases Fred Ross found a potentially explosive issue around which to rally the Mexican American community into supporting the efforts of the Unity League . . . ”⁷ (I am not knocking the technique as effective in organizing, I am only concerned about the socio-economic goals of many of those using this technique.)

I have already mentioned (page 127) that Fred Ross was instrumental in the founding and organization of the Community Service Organization (CSO) and that in 1950 he met Cesar Chavez and persuaded Chavez to go to work for the CSO and later to take training from Saul Alinsky. Looking at these two men, it is no wonder that the Marxist-oriented Alinsky rates Fred Ross and Cesar Chavez among his top disciples. It is also no wonder that these two men (still working closely together) are responsible for creating one of the most effective socialist “people’s organizations” in the country — the United Farm Workers Organizing Committee (UFWOC).

I have already discussed the three major Chicano organizations: the Alianza (Reies Tijerina); the Crusade for Justice (Corky Gonzales); and the UFWOC (Cesar Chavez). Since it would be next to impossible to discuss each and every one of the hundreds of local organizations involved in this movement, I will try only to give a brief accounting of the better known and larger ones along with the philosophy of their leaders and their position in implementing El Plan de Aztlán. The important National Chicano Moratorium Committee will be discussed in the next chapter.

⁷AZTLAN, the Journal of the Mexican American Cultural Center, University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA), Vol. 1, No. 1, 1970, p. 62.

X THE BROWN BERETS

The para-military Brown Berets are the most vocal and violent of the Chicano youth groups. Their main headquarters and largest chapter is located in East Los Angeles, although they claim membership in such diverse areas as Fresno, Denver, San Antonio and Chicago. Their counterpart in New Mexico call themselves the Black Berets, and their Puerto Rican counterpart in the New York area call themselves the Young Lords, but regardless they are all usually armed, frequently involved in incidents of violence, wear guerrilla army-type uniforms complete with Ché-like berets and have organizational “platforms” which leave no doubt as to their political philosophy — they have labeled their product correctly.

The origins of the Brown Berets is subject to controversy. Certain segments of the community claim that Bert Corona of MAPA (we’ll get to MAPA shortly) was responsible, others maintain it was SNCC (Stokely Carmichael’s Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee), and still others are convinced that the Berets are the creation of Father John B. Luce of the Episcopal Church of the Epiphany in East Los Angeles.¹ However, the prime minister of the Brown

¹This is the same Episcopal church which let the Ron Karenga gang use its bus to attend the Reies Tijerina convention in 1967 (see pages 42-9) and where the militant and now-famous *La Raza* magazine was first printed (see page 343).

Berets, David Sanchez, maintains they began "spontaneously." (?)

David Sanchez at the age of sixteen was selected by the Mayor's Advisory Youth Council as its Los Angeles chairman for 1966: "An outstanding high school student and exemplary young man." One of Sanchez's projects was the Young Citizens for Community Action, which later changed its name to the Young Chicanos for Community Action (an interesting change). Headquarters were set up at the La Piranya Coffee House, the beginning rent being paid by Father Luce's Church of the Epiphany.²

One thing positive about Father John B. Luce: He is a most controversial and enigmatic figure. He has been termed a Communist, nihilist and anarchist by those in positions of authority in East Los Angeles, and many of these people believe that nearly all Chicano militant activity can be traced to this forty-year-old, Harvard-graduate, Episcopalian minister.

Some interesting comments about this early stage of the Brown Berets were made by Eliezer Risco. Risco is the ex-editor of the militant *La Raza* publication (which played such an important role in the August 29, 1970, Chicano riots in East Los Angeles). He was arrested and charged with conspiracy during the East Los Angeles high school walkouts. He was a former organizer for Cesar Chavez's UFWOC. And he is a close friend of Father Luce (who has

²Nyle C. Frank, "An Analysis of the March 1968 East Los Angeles High School Walkouts," M.A. thesis, Department of Political Science, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1968, p. 51.

said, "Risco was trained by Ché Guevara").³ Risco explains that the Young Chicanos for Community Action were "a bunch of nice kids that began reading about community issues and began setting up community projects, like taking kids to camp or going to Delano and raising food for the farm workers [Risco, Father Luce and Cesar Chavez are reportedly close friends]. At one point they decided to have a coffeehouse . . . but the sheriff decided that [the coffeehouse] was a bad place because the kids drew a picket line in front of the sheriff's station where there had been a case of police brutality. So they told parents not to allow kids to go there because they were Communists, they were dope pushers, they were addicts."⁴

Within that first year the Young Chicanos for Community Action had changed their name to the Brown Berets and had acquired (from some source or other) some rather interesting political philosophies. Sanchez began declaring that many of the Brown Berets would shoot their own parents "for the revolution."⁵ And further: "There will be mass sniping in the streets of East Los Angeles . . . Don't misunderstand the Chicano. We're not like the hippies with all this love and flower bullshit. We're fighters. The Man knows this and that's why he's really afraid when we get together in something like the Brown Berets."⁶

The Brown Berets pledge "to protect, guarantee and secure the rights of the Mexican American by any and all

³*Ibid.*, p. 39.

⁴Stan Steiner, *La Raza*, (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), p. 117.

⁵Nyle C. Frank, *op. cit.*, p. 52.

⁶*Open City*, Los Angeles, March 15, 1968, p. 3. ("The Story of the Brown Berets").

means necessary." Listed in their ten-point platform (more about this later) you find a demand for a guaranteed annual income of \$8,000 for all Mexican American families; that the right to vote be extended to all Mexican Americans whether or not they speak English; and that all Mexican Americans be tried by juries consisting of only Mexican Americans.⁷

Found in the Brown Beret Headquarters, along with instructions on sabotage and guerilla warfare, were some fascinating hand-written instructions for members. Along with their studied-image of a para-military unit, the Brown Berets were to "be clean cut — ALWAYS." There was even a ten day deadline to have "long hair off." (If you can visualize an equal-parts mix of Ché Guevara and the Boy Scouts, you come up with the outward appearance of the Brown Berets.) And most interesting was their approach to stealing: "Thiefs: No stealing from members to people in movement. 'Thou shall not steal from persons in movement.' If want to steal ask Prime Minister."⁸

According to Dr. Ralph Guzmán (remember he is the California PhD-activist who, among many other things, was turned to for advice when Reies Tijerina was scaring New Mexico half to death): "The Brown Berets may represent a social movement that is formed because of inequities that are real. [When Dr. Guzmán uses the term they *may*, it is his academic way of expressing his belief that they *do*.] Their concern is probably not exclusively isolated to the

⁷*College Times*, campus newspaper, California State College at Los Angeles, Aug. 9, 1968.

⁸For photostat copies of these directives see "An Analysis of the March 1968 East Los Angeles High School Walkouts," by Nyle C. Frank, *op. cit.*, Appendix A.

East Los Angeles area alone. This is a movement of national interest."⁹

By 1969 the Brown Berets reportedly had sixty well-established chapters throughout the country; had signed a mutual support pact with Reies Tijerina's Alianza (along with the Black Panthers and Ron Karenga's US gang);¹⁰ and were listed by police intelligence as "violent or subversive or both."¹¹

(Taxpayers note: One college program for disadvantaged and/minority students known as the Educational Opportunities Program (EOP) was funded in 1969 in the amount of \$250,000 for 124 students — \$2,000 per student. Documented Congressional testimony of an investigation of just one college — California State College at Los Angeles — revealed that forty-three students attending Cal State under this program belonged to militant organizations in Los Angeles . . . including David Sanchez, prime minister of the Brown Berets along with eleven other Brown Beret members and one young Chicano member of the Communist Party, David Mares. Ho hum.)¹²

In March of 1970, David Sanchez was arrested and charged with two counts of assault with intent to commit murder and one count of possession of explosive material. He was found not guilty of the charges that he attempted to

⁹*College Times*, *loc. cit.*, Aug. 9, 1968.

¹⁰See page 49 of this book.

¹¹*Extent of Subversion in the New Left*, Hearings before the Internal Security Subcommittee of the U. S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Part 1, Jan. 20, 1970, p. 3.

¹²*Ibid.*, p. 23. For some EOP enrollment statistics see *UCLA Daily Bruin*, campus newspaper, University of California at Los Angeles, Feb. 5, 1971.

fire-bomb a police patrol car in East Los Angeles — the judge said that testimony of a prosecution witness who said she saw Sanchez throw the molotov cocktail was insufficient for a conviction.¹³

Three months later David Sanchez was the featured speaker at a huge Cesar "nonviolent" Chavez rally in Indio, California, where he poignantly deplored the inequities of the Anglo system, the racism and *injustice*.¹⁴

During August, 1970, Sanchez led the Brown Berets (and their high school youth arm — the Junior Berets) into active participation in the National Chicano Moratorium demonstration in East Los Angeles that culminated in such tragic riots.

In November, 1970, the San Diego County Grand Jury issued indictments against three members of the Brown Berets charging manufacturing and distributing firebombs, criminal syndicalism (advocating the use of illegal means in order to bring about political change), and one charge of soliciting murder. Arrested were David Rico, 24, who is an active member of MECHA at San Diego City College¹⁵ (that's the Chicano group that lowered the American flag and raised the Aztlan flag in a declaration of the Nation of Aztlan's independence)¹⁶; Richard Gonsalves, an ex-drug user and now active Chicano student at San Diego City College who says he has now "realized that a total societal change is needed in order to change the inequities of this society . . ."¹⁷; and Carlos Calderon, 24, editor of the Brown

¹³*Los Angeles Times*, July 25, 1970.

¹⁴*Riverside Press Enterprise*, Riverside, Calif., June 9, 1970.

¹⁵*La Verdad*, loc. cit., December, 1970.

¹⁶See page 276 of this book.

¹⁷*La Verdad*, loc. cit., December, 1970.

Beret supplement of the *Street Journal*¹⁸ (a radical San Diego underground newspaper), writer for the *San Diego Free Press*,¹⁹ and an ex-student of the University of Texas at El Paso where he was a member of a delegation (McCarthyites and the New Organization for Mexican American Students — NOMAS) which demonstrated at the 1968 Democratic convention in Chicago.²⁰

Carlos Calderon had recently spent two months in Cuba, returning as a firm believer in their "system." According to a San Diego Chicano paper: "It became obvious to him [Calderon] that there is a need to form a new society of equality and respect; but that in order to do that the source of injustice must be eliminated — capitalism."²¹

According to Calderon himself: "The Chicano Movement fully understands the historical necessity of the Cuban Revolution and we also realize that our role in that same revolutionary process will not be denied. We cannot deny the validity of the ideological foundations of the Cuban Revolution . . . Political oppression will not stop the same people that gave birth to Zapata and Ché."²²

(The "ideological foundation of the Cuban Revolution" was communism; Zapata was a "Communist who never heard of communism,"²³ and Ché Guevara was a Communist who dedicated his life to communism. I will leave the labeling of Brown Beret Calderon and the whole Chicano

¹⁸*Los Angeles Times*, Nov. 16, 1970.

¹⁹*La Verdad*, loc. cit., December, 1970.

²⁰*Ibid.*

²¹*Ibid.*

²²*Third World* campus newspaper of the Third College, University of California at San Diego, Dec. 3, 1970, p. 1.

²³Ronald Atkin, *Revolution! Mexico 1910-1920* (New York: John Day Co., 1970), p.

Movement — not to be confused with Mexican Americans — up to the reader and consumer-advocate Ralph “honesty-in-packaging” Nader.)

Carlos Calderon believes that his arrest and the arrest of the other two Brown Berets²⁴ is “one of simple political repression directed against the Chicano Movement.” He goes on to explain: “Over the past year [1970] the Chicano Community has displayed a political militancy that hitherto has not been seen; in eight months Chicanos [in San Diego] have seized public or state property three times, stopped construction of a freeway, stopped construction of a California Highway Patrol Station, and held an anti-war Moratorium. In the wake of *such successes* [my emphasis] the local government is attempting to intimidate the Chicano Movement by putting us on trial . . .”²⁵

It is interesting to speculate on Father John Luce’s contention that he continues to work with the Brown Berets in order to “straighten them out.” Father Luce started with a young man (David Sanchez) who at sixteen was “an outstanding high school student and exemplary young men” and then “straightened him out” to become the prime minister of the Brown Berets advocating that the Berets should shoot their parents, if necessary, for the “revolution.”

That kind of “straightening out” reminds me of the leader of the Presbyterian Mission in Watts (Rev. William Hervey) who told me that the mission in Watts (the Westminster

²⁴Also arrested and charged with selling a sawed-off shotgun to a police undercover officer, was Thomas Meza, 20, who recently spent six weeks harvesting sugar cane (and ideas) in Cuba. (*Los Angeles Times*, Nov. 16, 1970.)

²⁵*Third World*, loc. cit., Dec. 3, 1970, p. 1.

Neighborhood Association) was “guiding” the young toughs in the Watts area and that through this guidance these young delinquents were “being straightened out.” Westminster’s special protégé was a young man by the name of Tommy Jaquette, who is now “straightened out” to the point where it is rumored that he is currently maneuvering into a position to take over the leadership of a Los Angeles coalition of the Black Panthers and the equally militant-and-violence-prone “US.” organization of Ron Karenga’s.

At times I’m inclined to wonder *who* needs “straightening out.”

At any rate, the Brown Berets, like their brothers in the Black Berets and their cousins in the Young Lords Party, are dedicated to revolution by their own admission. All three groups not only are well trained in sabotage but usually are well armed at all times. All three groups have good PR programs aimed at getting the support of the community — programs like free-breakfast-programs-for-starving-little-Chicanos and free health clinics which frequently, like similar Black Panther programs, everyone knows about but few people can personally vouch for their effectiveness or even, at times, for their existence. Such programs do, however, contribute to the Chicano ideological contention that these services should be provided to the people “for free,” that it is their “right” to them, and it is only because of the existence of a greedy, materialistic capitalistic system that these “rights” are currently denied.

Members of all three groups frequently belong to other activists groups or start new groups themselves. For example, in Los Angeles many Berets are also members of MECHA, the college Chicano group, and one Brown Beret

member went on to form La Junta ²⁶ for the purpose of organizing members of rival East Los Angeles gangs to stop them from fighting among each other so they can unify and fight the Establishment.

All three groups have a specific platform upon which their actions are based, but since the platforms are so similar, I'll discuss the specific points in the next sections covering the Black Berets and the Young Lords. These platforms are important as they leave no doubt of the anti-American, anti-capitalist, pro-socialist/communist dedication of these groups.

So please — read on!

²⁶La Junta is headed by Gilberto Cruz Olmeda, an ex-Beret, one of the indictees in the high school walkouts of March, 1968, and was an EOP (Educational Opportunities Program) student at Cal State (see page 249). La Junta was given \$5,000 by the Episcopalian Church's General Special Convention Fund (GSCP). (*Extent of Subversion in the New Left*, loc. cit., Jan. 20, 1970, pp. 2, 10, 23.)

THE BLACK BERETS

The Black Berets are the New Mexican Chicano counterpart of the Brown Berets, and, as far as I can see, have the same ideologies and goals. Although the name suggests a Negro group, the Black Berets are very much Chicano. Their name comes only from the fact that they wear black berets rather than brown ones.

Members are governed by rules and a 21-point program (or platform) which starts out, "We, the members of the Black Berets of Albuquerque, Aztlan [Albuquerque is in New Mexico to most of us] . . . in order to combat injustices, racial discrimination and oppression, have set up a defense against the repressive agencies which carry out these established practices against the Chicano and all Third World peoples . . . We realize that to save our people we must be motivated, not only by the *hatred* [my emphasis] for the marrano racista [racist pig], but the great emotions and feelings of love that we have for our Raza and the Third World peoples . . ."

The platform includes such points as (and they are *not*

¹*El Grito del Norte*, a Chicano publication, Espanola, N.M., Nov. 10, 1970.

The police, who were disguised as hippies when they killed Francisco García, said they had come investigating a big "marijuana smuggling ring" and thought García was a suspect. But, they admitted, he had no part in any "smuggling ring." It was just "a mistake."

It was out of deep anger and frustration caused by the kinds of injustice described in this chapter that thirty-six-year-old Ricardo Chávez Ortiz hijacked a plane on April 13, 1972. He demanded only to be given radio and television time—so that he could express the grievances of poor Raza to the nation. After the broadcast, Ricardo handed his unloaded pistol to the pilot and said, "Captain, forgive me. I never wanted to hurt anyone." Thousands of Raza rallied to his defense, but Chávez Ortiz was tried and sentenced to life imprisonment.

During his broadcast, Ricardo said: "These wars that have been fought have been a crime . . . because these people have gone to fight with others, and for what reason?" That is the question more and more Raza have been asking. As the Raza mother said, our war is here—not overseas. In the very act of protesting against the war, and in seeing how our protests were treated by the gringo system, we learned the truth of her words. Our enemy was never the Vietnamese, Cambodians, or Laotians, our enemy was and is right here.

Viva La Raza!
The Struggle of The Mexican-American People
By Elizabeth Sottholand Martínez & Enriqueta Longeaux y Vásquez
Doubleday & Company, Inc. Garden City, New York 1974
13

Viva La Revolución!

ACROSS THE NATION, the cries ring out: "Viva mi Raza!" "Chicano Power!" "Huelga!" "Raza Sí, Guerra No!" Everywhere our people assert their new-found pride and their refusal to accept any longer the oppression of Raza. We hear those cries from small children and grandparents, men and women, and especially from the youth.

The youth is responding to the needs of La Raza in many ways. With fiery enthusiasm and energy, they have helped to organize our communities for action. Again and again, it has been the so-called legal system—the police and the courts—that forced the youth to organize for defense. We could almost say that the

police, by their own abuses and brutality, have organized our people.

One of the first youth organizations—the Brown Berets—was born in Los Angeles, where over a million Chicanos make up the nation's biggest barrio. East Los Angeles has long been a Mexican stronghold and the scene of brutal gringo oppression. Much blood was shed in the takeover of California, and again in the “Zoot-Suit Riots” of 1943. Those riots strengthened our awareness of the need for self-defense. The 1940s became the pachuco era—the pachuco being the young man of the barrio who rejects the dominant society and will fight to affirm his identity. The pachuco tradition is very much alive today and we can see it in the pachuco language called Caló—a sort of code that is written on the walls of barrios in Los Angeles, Chicago, and other cities. The pachuco of today is called a *bato loco*—“crazy guy”—but he is the same person in spirit.

It was out of this history and these traditions that the Brown Berets came to be organized in Los Angeles. Their motto was: “To serve, observe, protect”—and this included defending the Raza community against attack by all means necessary, including arms.

The founder and prime minister of the Berets was David Sánchez. In 1966, David was named “outstanding high school student” by the mayor's Advisory Youth Council of Los Angeles. One of his projects was the Young Citizens for Community Action (later Young Chicanos for Community Action), which helped collect food for the striking Delano farmworkers. He and

his friends also served the community in other ways that were far from “militant.”

But when the young Chicanos decided to open a coffeehouse to provide recreation for teen-agers, the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department felt it was a threat. They didn't want Chicanos getting together that much. The police began to harass the group and the coffeehouse, and finally they beat David Sánchez.

That experience made the group become openly militant. In the fall of 1967, they changed the name of their group to the Brown Berets. Soon there were groups of Berets in many parts of California, and later as far away as Milwaukee and Detroit.

The basic goal of the Los Angeles Brown Berets, they said, was “to unite our people under the flag of independence. By independence we mean the right to self-determination, self-government, freedom, and land.” Their program included demands for the return of stolen land, an end to the police occupation of Raza communities, an end to the robbery of our communities by businessmen, an end to the drafting of Chicanos, Chicano control of Chicano education, and housing fit for human beings. They also said that the border lands should be open to La Raza whether they were born north or south of “the fence.”

The Los Angeles Brown Berets included both men and women. They began by setting up centers where citizens could bring their complaints of police brutality. They also published a newspaper, *La Causa*, which carried reports on police brutality. The Berets often provided a sense of security to individuals and families,

and were often called on to provide security at public demonstrations by Raza.

The beret worn by these young Chicanos became a symbol of help to the community, and a symbol of militant Chicano youth everywhere. For local reasons, some groups call themselves the Black Berets while others are Brown Berets. But the color makes little difference to Chicanos; what counts is their service to the people. What counts is that the youth have started people's clinics, youth centers, anti-drug programs, and many other projects. Beret groups have provided free breakfast-for-children programs much as the Black Panthers and the Young Lords Party (of young Puerto Ricans) have done.

One of the most important targets of the youth groups has been the school system, which has never served the needs of our people. In Los Angeles, one fifth of the city's students are Raza and in 1967 there were seventy-six schools where Chicanos formed the majority of students. But the Anglo school officials never made any allowance for our culture and history. Chicanos in Los Angeles had the highest "dropout rate" of all racial groups. At Garfield High School, 90 per cent Chicano, over half the students did not finish the twelfth grade. To Raza, it was clear that those "drop-outs" were really forced out.

In the spring of 1968, the students began pressing the Board of Education for bilingual education, the firing of racist teachers, more emphasis on the Mexican cultural heritage, better school buildings, and many other reforms. The board refused ALL changes. So in March, a school boycott began and soon thousands of

students had walked out of five Los Angeles high schools. These protests came to be known as school "blow-outs." Several Black schools supported the Chicanos.

The Board of Education still refused to act on the students' demands. Instead, they had thirteen teachers arrested for supposedly leading the blow-outs. Dozens of barrio organizations as well as teachers' associations and Black groups supported the "East Los Angeles Thirteen," but still they were convicted. One of them, Sal Castro, was suspended from teaching.

Sal Castro was a popular young teacher and his suspension angered the Raza community. The people took over the meeting room of the Board of Education and occupied it for a week. They held meetings of the "Liberated Chicano Board of Education" and planned a new school system. The regular board finally took Sal Castro off suspension.

Two years later, none of the thirty-eight demands made in the blow-outs had been met, and students again boycotted the schools. The police came and beat eight students at Roosevelt High School, and arrested dozens of students as well as adults.

The Los Angeles blow-outs made the Brown Berets a target of police vengeance. Their minister of information was accused of conspiracy to start the blow-outs. Beret headquarters were fire-bombed more than once. Police planted a spy, an undercover agent, in the Berets. Then came the big frame-up at the Biltmore Hotel.

The Biltmore Hotel incident took place in April 1969, when Governor Ronald Reagan spoke at a con-

ference of "Spanish-speaking" people—meaning Mexican-Americans from the Establishment. Several fires broke out at the hotel and Reagan's speech was interrupted by Chicanos protesting Reagan's racism with cries of "*Que viva La Raza!*" and the Chicano hand-clap. Fourteen people were arrested and charges later brought against six—who became known as the Biltmore Six. Two of these Chicanos were Brown Berets.

In grand jury hearings and two trials held after the incident, it was revealed that a police undercover agent planted in the Berets had helped to buy the flares used in the Biltmore fires and had stood guard while a Beret set one of the fires. The evidence indicated that the agent did not want to prevent the fires, as a policeman should, but instead wanted to help get the Berets arrested. This kind of action, of weakening an organization like the Berets by helping or inciting its members to carry out illegal actions for which they are arrested, has become a common tactic in the repression of our people. Thanks to the exposure of the agent in the Biltmore case, the jury acquitted four of the group and could not reach a verdict on the fifth.

The Los Angeles blow-outs drew much attention to the educational needs of Chicanos and many school protests followed. Denver, Colorado had its West High School blow-out in September 1969—which led to a police riot against the people. Crystal, Texas, had its big walk-out that same year and there have since been Chicano student protests from San Antonio to East Chicago, Indiana; from Albuquerque to Milwaukee, from San Jose, California, to the small towns of Alamosa and Rocky Ford, Colorado. In these demonstra-

tions, the students have had much strong support from their parents.

The spirit of protest and Chicanismo has swept not only the high schools but also the colleges and universities. Many Chicano student organizations have been formed on campus to fight the racism that exists. This racism begins with the fact that so few Chicanos ever get a chance at college. In one county of California, for example, the population in 1968 was more than a third Chicano—but only thirty-five out of over eight thousand students at the state college in that area were Chicano. The racism is even worse when we look at the courses of study offered—which have not taught Raza's history and culture, or told the truth about U.S. history and culture.

Two of the best-known college student organizations have been MECHA (Movimiento Estudiantil Chicano de Aztlán) and UMAS (United Mexican-American Students), both born in California. As a result of efforts made by them and other Chicano groups, a large number of universities now have Chicano studies programs. These programs make college education have much more meaning for our people. There is also a growing number of Chicano students who get involved with problems beyond the campus like the farmworkers' struggle, welfare, food stamps, police, health, and other community issues. But there should be still more.

Students have also taken part in the struggle against racism as we see it in the mass media. Our people have filed lawsuits against TV stations, newspapers, and radio for discrimination at all levels. In many cases, the news media have been forced to hire Chicano

Ethnic Organizations and Leadership

THE voluntary associations of Mexican Americans owe their origin to a large variety of circumstances, and they have highly diverse goals. In some instances, organizations formed in response to a galvanizing event and then expanded their activity. For example, the American G.I. Forum was established when a funeral home in Texas refused to bury the body of a Mexican-American soldier, a World War II casualty. When the organization's protest led to the soldier's burial in Arlington Cemetery, it continued with a varied program of social action. However, most associations that were formed in reaction to a specific grievance vanished once the abrasiveness of the offense was removed or forgotten.

The first voluntary associations were of the mutual-benefit type so common

Ethnic Organizations and Leadership

Mexicana (1924). These associations performed a limited welfare role. They were in part also substitutes for Anglo organizations which Mexican individuals could not easily join. Large numbers of Mexican-American clubs and similar associations performed purely social functions, and they still do. In addition, hundreds of Catholic organizations were established in the early part of this century to serve Mexican-American communities.

Organizational activity increased greatly during the 1920s, the period of the first mass immigration. Some of the associations formed at that time reflected the presence of urban Mexican-American achievers. The organizations met their members' status needs and made an effort to validate the group before the larger society. The most notable, lasting association of this period is the League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC), which developed a number of educational programs. The 1920s witnessed also the establishment of more militant organizations, such as the Mexican-American Liberation Front. These were active mainly in agricultural areas and mining towns, but they were quickly repressed by employers.

A new era of general organizational activity began in the period after World War II. The war years had brought Mexican Americans into closer contact with American society, particularly in the cities. Increased urbanization produced some material benefits but little other change. Discrimination continued, housing conditions were poor, and access to places of public accommodation remained restricted. The tension of this period reached a climax in the Los Angeles *pachuco* riots of 1943. Old-line associations, such as the *Alianza Hispano-Americana* and the *Spanish-American Recreational Committee*, proved incapable of providing social defense. Hence, new organizations were established to meet new needs. In this process, Mexican-American war veterans, bringing back new perceptions of opportunities and of discrimination in civilian life, played an important part.

The new groups formed since the end of World War II include the Community Service Organization (CSO), the American G.I. Forum, the Mexican American Political Association (MAPA), and the Political Association of Spanish-Speaking Organizations (PASSO). In contrast to the earlier associations of urban achievers, these organizations are not limited to the middle class, nor do they exclude the foreign born or require English as the official language.

INCREASING POLITICAL ORIENTATION

Despite the difficulty of classifying voluntary ethnic organizations, it can be said that the goals of Mexican-American associations have unquestionably changed in the direction of social action and political intent. The Community Service Organization, for example, undertook in the 1950s the first massive voter-registration

Ethnic Organizations and Leadership

THE voluntary associations of Mexican Americans owe their origin to a large variety of circumstances, and they have highly diverse goals. In some instances, organizations formed in response to a galvanizing event and then expanded their activity. For example, the American G.I. Forum was established when a funeral home in Texas refused to bury the body of a Mexican-American soldier, a World War II casualty. When the organization's protest led to the soldier's burial in Arlington Cemetery, it continued with a varied program of social action. However, most associations that were formed in reaction to a specific grievance vanished once the abrasiveness of the offense was removed or forgotten.

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POLITICAL INTERACTION

More often than not the political leader is recruited by Anglos. This process of selection is likely to create initial problems of validation: The ethnic emissary may be fully approved by the Anglo establishment but rejected by Mexican Americans. Further problems arise as the political leader begins to officiate. Acquiring the viewpoint (and the workload) of a Federal or state legislator, for example, he may fail to live up to the community's expectation that he will make *its* welfare his main or exclusive concern. Or he may maintain good credentials with his Mexican-American clientele but act in such manner that he incurs the displeasure of the Anglo establishment.

The problem of the leader's validation in the Mexican-American community is often complicated by mistrust. The masses feel that spokesmen do not necessarily represent the people's interests. Past experience lends some credence to this view. Further, it is said that Mexican Americans begrudge success to their leaders. An ingroup anecdote on this point among political activists is attributed to a Mexican-American lawyer from San Antonio: "If a Mexican and an Anglo were both trying to climb greased poles with prizes at the top, the Anglos would clap when the Anglo reached the top, but when the Mexican got near the prize the Mexicans would pull the fellow down by his breeches."¹⁰

Generally, it is much harder for the ethnic minority than for the Anglo establishment to withdraw its support from political intermediaries. When such intermediaries fall into disrepute among Mexican Americans, they retain many of the trappings and even the rewards of leadership long after the community has rejected them. "We have very few people who can talk to the Anglos," a Mexican American observed. Therefore, "we cannot afford to punish them too severely."

Fragmentation and Parochialism

Mexican-American leaders are highly individualistic and competitive or often even hostile to one another. These characteristics add to political disunity. Some of the ethnic organizations represent the special view of only a few individuals or their urge for recognition. When these persons are dislodged from an association, they often go on to establish another. Many persons who belong to the elite seem to be unwilling to recognize the leadership of other members of the elite and share it. So common is this trait that the authors, at the beginning of their study, were warned by insiders to use the term "key people" rather than "leaders" in exploring questions of leadership. It would seem that it is easier to share the reputation of being a "key person" than a "leader."

Among the reasons for this fragmentation is the highly differentiated composition of the Mexican-American group which has been crossed throughout the

Ethnic Organizations and Leadership

leadership.¹¹ Equally if not more salient is the prevailing parochialism of Mexican-American leaders.

Most of the leaders are men and women whose experience has been almost exclusively limited to one part of the Southwest. Their parochial commitments involve narrow views about the identity of the group and about its social problems. Parochialism inhibits the discovery of ethnic commonalities and agreement on national issues. It manifests itself, among other things, in dissension among the leaders about such basic issues as what to call the ethnic group, what are the main social problems that face the group, and what strategies should be pursued to resolve the few questions upon which the leaders do agree. Disagreement over the name of an organization reflects the more pervasive "battle of the name" that plays such a large role in the self-perceptions of Mexican Americans (Chapter 16).

National or regional meetings where Mexican-American leaders attempt to present a united front before Anglo society or build internal group unity are often threatening to some of the leaders. The exposure of issues is felt to reflect upon their efficacy or their knowledge of conditions in their communities. The difficulty is compounded by conflicting pluralistic or assimilationist stances taken by spokesmen.

Parochialism and poor communication among leaders across the Southwest reinforce one another. There is no national or regional medium of communication. The ethnic press is largely localized and has a low circulation. The journals published by some of the Mexican-American associations serve more or less as organizational house-organs.

The Generational Split

The classic conflict between the young and the old has become more acute in the Mexican-American elite, as elsewhere. The established leaders have been generally slow in recruiting young people for leadership roles. On the other hand, young Mexican Americans, like other youth, consider themselves to be more in tune with present reality than are their elders, and so they impatiently clamor for change. Age, long a basis for authority among the Mexican-American people, is now often the target of youthful contempt. In this sense, the young in this group are like other Americans—products of the forces that disturb our whole society. But their search for roles in political or social action is often complicated by their simultaneous search for personal identity, or the meaning of being a real Mexican inside the American system.

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Among the reasons for this fragmentation is the highly differentiated composition of the Mexican-American group, which has been stressed throughout this volume. Also, the condition of deprivation keeps the poor wary and suspicious of all who offer to help them—including their own kind. Always in search of the "ultimate" leader, the large masses of Mexican Americans seem to be quickly dissatisfied with existing

involve nation-wide issues about the identity of the group and about its social problems. Parochialism inhibits the discovery of ethnic commonalities and agreement on national issues. It manifests itself, among other things, in dissension among the leaders about such basic issues as what to call the ethnic group, what are the main social problems that face the group, and what strategies should be pursued to resolve the few questions upon which the leaders do agree. Disagreement over the name of an organization reflects the more pervasive "battle of the name" that plays such a large role in the self-perceptions of Mexican Americans (Chapter 16).

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The Black Power movement has served to widen the generational gap by providing models of militant action for young Mexican Americans who aspire to leadership. The past few years have witnessed the formation of a number of militant youth organizations, largely among Mexican-American students. One such group calls itself the Brown Berets. Mexican-American students at colleges and even high schools have staged walk-outs, sit-ins, and boycotts, and they have occasionally

POLITICAL INTERACTION

used violent techniques of protest. Demands for Mexican-American study programs and for greater recognition in history books of Hispano-Mexican cultural contributions to the Southwest have been proliferating. This ferment among young Mexican Americans cuts across social class and regional lines, uniting high-school dropouts, college students, and ex-convicts in a loosely articulated network of action groups. This has become a true social movement, known among its members as the *chicano* movement.

SUMMARY

Many minorities in the United States have been able to improve their position by organizing themselves for community and political action and thus exerting some influence on their social environment. Although voluntary associations among Mexican Americans have a long history, it was only after World War II that organizations oriented to this type of action were formed. Since the war, too, some of the older organizations have changed their goals in favor of greater social or political involvement. Until recently, most of these efforts were handicapped by scanty financial resources, a lack of staff and organizational expertise, and only sporadic help coming (often because it was not encouraged to come) from outside the community. The household surveys in Los Angeles and San Antonio revealed a low level of awareness of most ethnic organizations among the respondents.

A typology of Mexican-American leaders shows a very complex pattern, though perhaps not any more complex than that of other minority groups. Leadership may be associated with economic accomplishment, Anglo acceptance, command of the English language, election to public office (often by both Anglo and Mexican voters), or professional work (as in the case of teachers, social workers and police officers). In most cases, leadership involves formal roles, but there are also the informal leaders at the neighborhood level, often women, who owe their influence to their reputation for "getting things done."

Among the main problems of Mexican-American leadership is the need for dual validation by the ethnic clientele and the dominant system. Without this dual validation, leadership roles can rarely be attained or preserved. Yet, approval by one source of power often entails rejection or mistrust by the other. (Again, this problem may not be any greater for Mexican Americans than for other kinds of ethnic leaders.) The generational conflict, too, is pervasive, but it may be felt more deeply among adult Mexican Americans because their tradition invests age with authority and respect.

The most serious problem of Mexican-American leadership is its fragmentation and parochialism. After decades of organizational activity, regional unity is still a distant goal. Although some of the ethnic associations have penetrated beyond their original base, usually Texas or California, each still has its main strength in the state

Ethnic Organizations and Leadership

will succeed is uncertain at this writing. The difficulties posed by multiple bases of leadership have diminished the political effectiveness of many other minorities, but they appear to be especially acute among Mexican Americans.

NOTES TO CHAPTER TWENTY-TWO

1. Interview with Al Pena, Commissioner of Bexar County, Texas.
2. As late as in 1938, the Mexican Consul of Los Angeles told a group of young Mexican Americans that "A Mexican will always be a Mexican. . . . Those who desire to become American citizens should drain their blood, dye their hair blond and change the color of their eyes. . . ." Consul Trujillo, quoted by Manuel de la Raza in the *Mexican Voice*, Los Angeles, Calif., November, 1938, p. 16.
3. To prevent the United States from entering the war, Alfred Zimmerman, the German Foreign Minister, offered the Republic of Mexico an alliance with Germany (and Japan) that would enable Mexico to recover large parts of the American Southwest. See Barbara W. Tuchman, *The Zimmerman Telegram* (London: Constable and Company Ltd, 1959). When Zimmerman's offer became known in the United States, questions arose about the loyalty of the Mexican-American population; and the position of the minority was threatened as was that of the Japanese Americans during World War II. There is no evidence of any subversive activity by Mexican-Americans in connection with the abortive German proposal. However, a Mexican-American writer reported many years later that Mexicans in World War I were considered security risks because of fears that the United States might be attacked from the South. See Raul Morin, *Among the Valiant: Mexican-Americans in World War II and Korea* (Los Angeles: Borden Publishing Company, 1963), p. 15.
4. George I. Sanchez, *Chicano Jewish Forum*, vol. 20 (1961-1962), p. 3.
5. Ford Foundation, news release of May 1, 1968. The Legal Defense and Educational Fund is described in the release as designed "to attack problems of discrimination and segregation through legal channels." The grant in support of the legal education of students from minority groups was made to the Fund for Public Education of the American Bar Association. Information regarding a "Southwest Council of La Raza" was received in a letter (June 3, 1968) from an official of The Ford Foundation addressed to Leo Grebler.
6. See Charles R. Wright and Herbert H. Hyman, "Voluntary Association Memberships of American Adults: Evidence from National Sample Surveys," *American Sociological Review*, XXIII (1958), pp. 284-294.
7. Gunnar Myrdal, *An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy* (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 1962), p. 724.
8. The notion of a reputational leader comes from Floyd Hunter's *Community Power Structure* (Chapel Hill, N.C.: The University of North Carolina Press, 1953).
9. Ralph C. Guzman, Beaman Patterson, and Dewey Park, "Comparative Access to Government: Three Minority Groups in Los Angeles County" (seminar paper, University of California, Los Angeles, Department of Political Science, Spring, 1962).
10. Quoted by Frances Jerome Woods in *Mexican Ethnic Leadership in San Antonio, Texas* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1949), p. 52.
11. The idea that minority groups search for a messiah to lead them out of their social problems is developed by James Q. Wilson in *Negro Politics: The Search for Leadership* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1960).