## El Cerrito keeps cell towers on holo

Decision gives council another year to research alternatives

> By Dale F. Mead Correspondent

El Cerrito has extended its moratorium on wireless antenna installations another year, continuing to block an application by T-Mobile USA to put up a cell phone tower in the middle of a Boy Scout

The City Council approved the extension at its May 2 meeting. The one-year moratorium was approved last year so the city could study alternatives to telecommunications towers, which have stirred opposition as they proliferate to meet skyrocketing demand.

Mt. Diablo Silverado Council of Boy Scouts of America owns Camp Herms at 1100 James Place. The council and T-Mobile contracted for the company to install the 77-foot transmission tower, camouflaged as a tree in the redwood-shrouded

and pay \$2,200 per month to the Scouts.

The installation was subject to El Cerrito's approval of a conditional use permit. Residents and scout leaders calling themselves Arlington Park Against Cell Towers quickly organized, generating hundreds of names on petitions to the council and the city.

The furor forced the company in March 2010 to put a hold on its permit pending before the Planning Commission. Then the city imposed a 45-day "urgency" moratorium (effective immediately) on all such telecommunications proposals May 17 and extended it to one year June 10.

This month's added extension to two years is the maximum that state law allows for

such urgency ordinances.
The staff backed up its request for more study time with a list of impacts that would result in the absence of new regulations encouraging use of other technologies instead of proliferating towers.

included Thev visual blight, pedestrian and traffic safety hazards from location of wireless transmission

equipment, operational conflicts with nearby facilities, and deterioration of the quality of life in neighborhoods.

Ending the moratorium now could cause the city to "miss opportunities to accelerate the implementation of new ... technologies" that "might improve service for customers (and) improve business for providers," Planning Manager Jennifer Carman said.

potential technol-One ogy is a fiber-fed distributed antenna system of smaller, lower-power antennas that can be installed on more numerous utility poles instead That system is being used in Huntington Beach.

"Once we're clear on what we're thinking about do-ing," she added, "we're talking about reaching out to the community," to find out "what is acceptable to the community. If you have to exchange a taller telephone pole for smaller antenna, would the community accept that?"

Residents on Taft Avenue in East Richmond Heights currently are fighting Contra Costa County's approval of a 12-foot taller PG&E utility pole to house T-Mobile antennas.

of large towers, Carman said.

**W West County Wastew** Plans and Programs Co tee - 9 a.m., 2910 Hillt Richmond, Study sess 222-6700. **W** Hercules City Counci

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Source: U.S. Geological Survey

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
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
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








# Court Upholds Cities' Ability to Regulate Communications Facilities on Aesthetic Grounds



Related Practice

<u>Telecommunications</u> <u>Municipal & Redevelopment Law</u>

OCTOBER 30, 2009

In the recently decided Sprint PCS Assets LLC v. City of Palos Verdes Estates (Case No. 05-56106; 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 22514), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that cities can regulate, on aesthetic grounds, communications facilities locating within a public right-of-way. The decision casts important light on the scope of cities' interests in regulating the aesthetics of city streets under the federal Telecommunications Act of 1996 (TCA). It also interprets narrowly the provisions of the TCA requiring that cities consider the adequacy of a carrier's coverage grid before denying facility applications.

The City of Palos Verdes Estates enacted an ordinance allowing the city to deny permits for wireless communications facilities based on "adverse aesthetic impacts arising from the proposed time, place and manner of use of the public property." The city denied on aesthetic grounds two applications filed by Sprint. The city's expressed planning concerns included the use of streets as part of the city's historic fabric, park borders and contributors to residential ambiance. These concerns were "important social, expressive, and aesthetic functions" granted to cities under the California Constitution and recognized as exempt from federal authority under the TCA. Sprint sued the city, contending that the denial violated both California law and the TCA. Although the trial court granted Sprint's motion for summary judgment, the Ninth Circuit reversed the decision and upheld the city's denial of permits on aesthetic grounds.

The Ninth Circuit found that the city's decision was consistent with the TCA's reservation of local land use control and that the city's decision was based on "substantial evidence contained in [the] written record." The court also found that Sprint's rights to access the right-of-way pursuant to the California Public Utilities Code did not preempt the city's aesthetic considerations in denying


permits.

Sprint tried to characterize the city's aesthetic regulations as a virtual ban on facilities, or a "significant gap," as prohibited under the TCA. The Court of Appeals disagreed with Sprint, noting that the record indicated that Sprint's radio frequency propagation maps were insufficient to establish a "significant gap" in coverage.

This case represents a clear recognition of California cities' ability to regulate communications facilities under the TCA on aesthetic grounds. It also provides useful guidance regarding how much evidence a telephone company must provide under federal law to support its claims that it has a gap in coverage that a city must permit to be filled. It is important to note that all local regulations regarding communications facilities must still be supported by substantial evidence and may not effectively prohibit the provision of wireless service.

### Regulation of Wireless Telecommunications Facilities

Regulation of wireless telecommunications facilities, including towers and antennae, is to some extent governed by the federal Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("TCA" or the "Act"), which amends Title 47 of the United States Code (U.S.C.), Section 332, pertaining to mobile services and, with limitations, may be controlled by local zoning, if it exists. In essence, the Act provides certain exceptions to the authority of a state or local government, or an instrumentality thereof, to regulate wireless telecommunications facilities. However, aside from specified exceptions, nothing in the Act "shall limit or affect the authority of a State or local government or instru-



mentality thereof over decisions regarding the placement, construction, and modification of personal wireless service facilities." Case law provides that a wireless telecommunications facility is subject to valid local zoning regulations and, in certain cases, may constitute a subdivision or land development subject to other appropriate regulations.<sup>2</sup>

Five limitations on state or local authority as cited in the Act, with commentary on each, are as follows:

1. The regulation of the placement, construction, and modification of personal wireless service facilities by any State or local government or instrumentality thereof shall not unreasonably discriminate among providers of functionally equivalent services . . . . 47 U.S.C. Section 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(I).

The TCA forbids discrimination between functionally equivalent providers of wireless telecommunications, even if a decision to deny an application was founded on substantial evidence and did not result in prohibiting wireless services.<sup>3</sup> In order to prove discrimination, the provider must make two primary showings. First, it must show that it was discriminated against by the local government agency. Second, it must show that such discrimination was unreasonable.<sup>4</sup> To satisfy the first prong of this test, the plaintiff

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(A).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> See Marshall Tp. Bd. of Supervisors v. Marshall Tp. Zoning Hearing Board, 717 A.2d 1 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998); Tu-Way Tower Co. v. Zoning Hearing Board (Tp. of Salisbury), 688 A.2d 744 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997) (wireless telecommunications facilities and augmentations thereof did not constitute "subdivisions" or "land development," but were subject to zoning regulation). But of. White v. Tp. of Upper St. Clair, 799 A.2d 188 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002) (lease of property to wireless telecommunications provider to construct facility constituted a subdivision). See also Upper Southampton Tp. v. Upper Southampton Tp. Zoning Hearing Board, 885 A.2d 85 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005) (land use development approval was required for construction of billboards), appeal granted, 895 A.2d 1265 (Pa. Apr. 4, 2006).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Schiazza v. Zoning Hearing Bd., Fairview Tp., York County, Pennsylvania, 168 F. Supp. 2d 361 (M.D. Pa. 2001).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> APT Pittsburgh Ltd. Partnership v. Lower Yoder Tp., 111 F. Supp. 2d 664, 674 (W.D. Pa. 2000).

must demonstrate that providers of "functionally equivalent" services were treated differently than it was treated.<sup>5</sup> Even if this is the case, the plaintiff must also show that the discrimination was unreasonable. It is unreasonable discrimination if the plaintiff can demonstrate that the proposed wireless service facility site is *not* substantially more intrusive than existing sites "by virtue of its structure, placement, or cumulative impact."

2. The regulation of the placement, construction, and modification of personal wireless service facilities by any State or local government or instrumentality thereof shall not prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the provision of personal wireless services. 47 U.S.C. Section 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II).

In order for an unsuccessful provider applicant to show a violation of subsection 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(H), it must demonstrate two things:

- First, the provider must show that its facility will fill an existing significant gap in the ability of remote users to access the national telephone network. In this context, the relevant gap, if any, is a gap in the service available to remote users. Not all gaps in a particular provider's service will involve a gap in the service available to remote users. The provider's showing on this issue will thus have to include evidence that the area the new facility will serve is not already served by another provider.<sup>7,8</sup>
- Second, the provider applicant must also show that the manner in which it proposes to fill the significant gap in service is the least intrusive on the values that the denial sought to serve. This will require a showing that a good faith effort has been made to identify and evaluate less intrusive alternatives, e.g., that the provider has considered less sensitive sites, alternative system designs, alternative tower designs, placement of antennae on existing structures, etc.<sup>9</sup>

Based on this interpretation of Section 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II), it is not essential for a provider whose application has been turned down "to show an express ban or moratorium, a consistent pattern of denials, or evidence of express hostility to personal wireless facilities." However, it is essential for the provider to demonstrate *more than* it was not granted "an opportunity to fill a gap in its service system."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> APT Pittsburgh Ltd. Parinership v. Lawer Yeder Tp., 111 F. Supp. 2d at 674.

<sup>6</sup> Schiazza v. Zoning Hearing Bd., Fairview Tp., York County, Pennsylvania, 168 F. Supp. 2d at 371 (citations omitted).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> APT Pittsburgh Ltd. Partnership v. Penn Tp., 196 F.3d 469, 480 (3d Cir. 1999).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> "[Elven if the area to be served is already served by another provider, the TCA may invalidate the denial of a variance if it has the effect of unreasonably discriminating between providers. Securing relief under this provision of the statute will require a showing that the other provider is similarly situated, i.e., that the 'structure, placement or cumulative impact' of the existing facilities makes them as or more intrusive than the proposed facility." 196 F.3d at 480 note 8.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> 196 F.3d at 480.

<sup>10</sup> Id.

<sup>11</sup> Id.

3. A State or local government or instrumentality thereof shall act on any request for authorization to place, construct, or modify personal wireless service facilities within a reasonable period of time after the request is duly filed with such government or instrumentality, taking into account the nature and scope of such request. 47 U.S.C. Section 332(c)(7)(B)(ii).

"Litigation under section 332(c)(7)(B)(ii) has arisen generally under two types of circumstances. The first is when local governmental entities have initiated moratoria on the granting of PWS [personal wireless service] facility siting permits or the processing of applications altogether . . . . The other area in which section 332(c)(7)(B)(ii) litigation has arisen is when the local entity simply takes too much time to grant or to deny the

PWS provider's application."12

With respect to moratoria, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Naylor v. Township of Hellam, stated that "the legislature has not acted to authorize municipalities to meet their planning objectives through the suspension, temporary or otherwise, of the process for reviewing land use proposals."13 The court also indicated that the ability of municipalities to initiate moratoria is neither an expressly granted power nor an extension of, or incidental to, any power to regulate land use or development in Pennsylvania.<sup>14</sup> Therefore, until the Commonwealth enacts legislation that authorizes moratoria, this potential circumstance is most likely a nonissue.

On the possible time concern, Act 2 of 2002 and Act 43 of 2002, both of which amend the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code (MPC),15 have tightened and made more equitable hearing requirements for variance and special exception applications before the zoning hearing board and conditional use applications before the governing body. The MPC now specifies that failure to conduct or complete, as well as commence, a hearing in a proceeding before the zoning hearing board or in a conditional use request before the governing body in compliance with specified hearing procedures results in a deemed approval. With these amendments, time is most likely a nonissue as well.

<sup>12</sup> Matthew N. McClure, Comment, Working Through The Static: Is There Anything Left to Local Control in the Siting of Cellular and PCS Towers After the Telecommunications Act of 1996? 44 Vill. L. Rev. 781 (1999) (citations omitted).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> Naylor v. Township of Hellam, 773 A.2d 770 (Pa. 2001).

<sup>14</sup> Id.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> 53 P.S. § 10101 et seq. ("Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code").

4. Any decision by a State or local government or instrumentality thereof to deny a request to place, construct, or modify personal wireless service facilities shall be in writing and supported by substantial evidence contained in a written record. 47 U.S.C. Section 332(c)(7)(B)(iii).

This section states that "any decision to deny a request...shall be in writing." It is also evident that any written negative decision shall be "supported by substantial evidence contained in a written record." However, this begs two questions: (1) What constitutes a "decision...in writing?" and (2) What constitutes "substantial evidence?"

#### "Decision . . . in Writing"

The MPC requires a "decision . . . in writing" for most subdivision and land development and zoning proceedings, including special exceptions, variances, and conditional uses. In the case of a proceeding before the zoning hearing board for a special exception or a variance, or before the governing body for a conditional use request, the zoning hearing board, the hearing officer, or the governing body, as the case may be,

shall render a written decision or, when no decision is called for, make written findings on the application.... Where the application is contested or denied, each decision shall be accompanied by findings of fact and conclusions based thereon together with the reasons therefor. Conclusions based on any provisions of this act [the MPC] or of any ordinance, rule or regulation shall contain a reference to the provision relied on and the reasons why the conclusion is deemed appropriate in the light of the facts found. 16

Requiring a more comprehensive written decision, which includes findings of fact and conclusions of law tied to the record, would facilitate court review if a decision is appealed.<sup>17</sup>

#### "Substantial Evidence"

"The [United States] Supreme Court explained, in the context of the deference to be afforded to NLRB [National Labor Relations Board] findings, that substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." This standard is applied when determining if decisions under the TCA are supported by substantial evidence. 19

A court in its review under the substantial evidence standard is not "to weigh the evidence contained in that record or substitute its own conclusions for those of the fact-finder" or the local zoning authority.<sup>20</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> 53 P.S. 10908(9) (MPC, Section 908(9)). See also Simonitis v. Zoning Hearing Board of Swoyersville Borough, 865 A.2d 284 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005), and 53 P.S. 10913.2(b)(1) (MPC, Section 913.2(b)(1)).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> Schwamberger, Christine, Zoning and Land Use in Pennsylvania, Cell Tower Regulation, Lorman Education Services, Eau Claire, Wisconsin, 2002.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> Sprint Spectrum L.P. v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Willistown Tp., 43 F. Supp. 2d 534 (E.D. Pa. 1999), citing Universal Camera v. NL.RB, 340 U.S. 474, 488, 71 S. Ct. 456, 95 L. Ed. 456 (1951) (internal quotations omitted).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> Sprint Spectrum L.P., 43 F. Supp. 2d at 540.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup>AT&T Wireless v. Zoning Board of Adjustment of the Borough of Ho-Ho-Kus, 197 F.3d 64, 71 (3d Cir. 1999), citing Williams v. Sullivan, 970 F.2d 1178, 1182 (3d Cir. 1992).


#### Pennsylvania Legislator's Municipal Deskbook, Third Edition (2006)

Rather, a court is to "determine whether there is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the challenged decision." Moreover, when the court evaluates substantial evidence, local zoning laws govern the weight to be given to it. 22

To enable a meaningful judicial review, a written decision cannot only rely on conclusory assertions, but must also provide some evidentiary foundation to support each assertion.<sup>23</sup> Moreover, "generalized concerns" of opposing parties would not be considered substantial evidence for an unfavorable decision against a personal wireless services provider.<sup>24</sup>

5. No State or local government or instrumentality thereof may regulate the placement, construction, and modification of personal wireless service facilities on the basis of the environmental effects of radio frequency emissions to the extent that such facilities comply with the Commission's regulations concerning such emissions. 47 U.S.C. Section 332(c)(7)(B)(iv).

This provision prohibits state or local regulation of wireless telecommunications facilities by ordinance or statute or the courts "on the basis of the effects of radio frequency emissions." It was enforced, for example, in *Omnipoint Corp. v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Pine Grove Tp.*, <sup>25</sup> where the court held that the zoning hearing board could not consider the potential health effects of a proposed wireless telecommunications facility, as alleged by residents, as substantial evidence pursuant to Sections 332(c)(7)(B)(iii), (iv) of the TCA.



#### Disputes

If a wireless service provider asserts that the state or local government has violated any of the five limitations or conditions cited above, <sup>26</sup> that provider may seek relief in a state or federal court, and the court must hear and decide such action expeditiously. <sup>27, 28</sup> An unsuccessful applicant may also petition

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> AT&T Wireless v. Zoning Board of Adjustment of the Borough of Ho-Ho-Kus, 197 F.3d at 71, citing Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 491, 71 S. Ct. 456, 95 L. Ed. 456 (1951).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> Sprint Spectrum L.P. v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Willistown Tp., 43 F. Supp. 2d at 540, citing Cellular Telephone Co. v. Town of Oyster Bay, 166 F.3d 490, 493-94 (2d Cir. 1999).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> Omnipoint Communications, Inc. v. City of Scranton, 36 F. Supp. 2d 222 (M.D. Pa. 1999), citing Virginia Metronet v. Board of Supervisors of James City County, 984 F. Supp. 966, 973 (E.D. Va. 1998).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> Omnipoint Communications, Inc., 36 F. Supp. 2d at 229, citing PrimeCo Personal Communications, L.P. v. Village of Fox Lake, 26 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1062 (N.D. III. 1998).

<sup>25 181</sup> F.3d 403 (3d Cir. 1999).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> 47 U.S.C. §§ 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(I), (i)(II), (ii), (iii), (iv).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> See Local Government Regulation of Wireless Telecommunication Facilities, 2d ed., Governor's Center for Local Government Services, Pennsylvania Department of Community and Economic Development, Harrisburg, Pa., 2002, p. 4.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(v).

#### Regulation of Wireless Telecommunications Facilities

the Federal Communications Commission if it claims that the state or local government based its siting decision in a manner inconsistent with clause (iv), which, again, prohibits state or local regulation of wireless telecommunications facilities "on the basis of the environmental effects of radio frequency emissions."<sup>29</sup>

#### Resources

Given that the regulation of wireless telecommunication facilities has been and continues to be an issue in many locales, there are numerous court cases and many publications on this topic. With regard to specific questions concerning the regulation of these facilities, we suggest that local officials consult with their municipal solicitor and recommend review of some other publications:

Local Government Regulation of Wireless Telecommunication Facilities, 2d ed., Pennsylvania Department of Community and Economic Development, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, 2002, 16 pages.

Local Officials Guide, Siting Cellular Towers, What You Need To Know, What You Need To Do, National League of Cities, Washington, D.C., 1997, 26 pages.

The Telecommunications Act of 1996: What It Means to Local Governments, National League of Cities, Washington, D.C.

#### Taxation of Cellular Towers

The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court in Shenandoah Mobile Co. v. Dauphin County Bd. of Assessment Appeals<sup>30</sup> upheld a court of common pleas decision which held that a cellular communications tower and related equipment are taxable realty. Because cellular towers are not specifically listed in the assessment laws as subject to or exempt from taxation, the Commonwealth Court applied a three-part test established in Appeal of Sheetz, Inc.<sup>31</sup> to determine whether cellular towers constitute "real estate" under the General County Assessment Law. When applying this three-part analysis in Shenandoah Mobile Co., the court concluded that a cellular communications tower was a part of the realty and therefore taxable as real estate.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iv), (v).

<sup>30 869</sup> A.2d 562 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>31</sup>657 A.2d 1011 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995), petition for allowance of appeal denied, 542 Pa. 653, 666 A.2d 1060 (1995). In Sheetz, the court had to determine whether a gasoline pump canopy was a fixture and, thus, taxable as realty, or whether it was personalty, and therefore not subject to realty tax.

# Attachment E – Petition Summary Wireless Telecommunications An Opportunity for Civic Excellence July 2011

Over one month from June 4<sup>th</sup> to July 4<sup>th</sup>, 2011—and 10 hours of canvassing pedestrians walking on Grand Avenue in Pasadena—93 individuals signed a petition indicating support for the appeal of an antenna planned for Grand Avenue and California Boulevard. Two-thirds (62) of the petitioners live in Pasadena. See the attached *Petition for Consideration by the City of Pasadena* with signatures.

Grand Avenue acts like a park, attracting pedestrians and bicyclists from neighboring cities as well as Pasadena. Of the 93 individuals who signed the petition, one-third were from cities other than Pasadena: 12 from South Pasadena; 10 from Los Angeles; two from Altadena; one from Alhambra; one from La Canada; one from Sierra Madre; and four from outside the immediate area (one each from Montebello, Encino, Rowland Heights and Simi Valley).

As one would expect, most signed the petition on a Saturday, Sunday or the Fourth of July holiday, although pedestrians could be seen walking along Grand Avenue every day of the week. Many of the pedestrians had pets. One woman said she suffers from MS, has been walking Grand Avenue everyday for 10 years, and is still going strong! Another said she was taking her granddaughter, who lives out-of-state, to see a new puppy down the street. A couple, who lives in Los Angeles, noted that they love the West Pasadena area and are hoping to move to the neighborhood. A pedestrian from Encino identified herself as a "Pasadena lover" and said she drives to Pasadena every week or so just to walk on Grand Avenue!

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Michelle Trafficante	1305 El Cerrito Circle	Solar -
LIA THATRIUM	12 225 Grand Ave -9	1030
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	Angela Cruz	410 Arroyo Terrane	ang-cruza) yahoo-com	
	LEE SALAS	1400 BRIXTON PD.	PASADONA, CA	
	Mirell O'Brien	1241 HilDrive	LA Angeles A gir	
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	MARIE GAUTHIER	240 N GRAND	MCGAU CO YAHOO COM	
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	SALLY CLAPK	721 So. GrandAve	tasadena	
	Hattall	1965 Hillside Nd	Pasadena	
	Mys Ooles	1582 Homewood Dr. Ald	odna CA	
	PRISCILLA Mª CLURE	1107 S. DEANGE GROVE	PASADENA, CA 91105	
	TERESITA GARCIA	219 N. Alozrado 84	Lox Angeles, 90026	
6/17	Pat Dashner	866 S. Arroyo Blu	d Pasadena 91105	
•	Jennifer Tucker	985 Mission St	South Pasadena 491030	
	Wendy Clough	2115, Ovany Garreblud WESIMMY GOM	Pascelong 91105	
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Name	Address	E-mail
Alexander Miller	49 S. Grand Ave.	Ajmiller @ usc.colu
MI) and Kay	6871 Los Altos Pl.	LA Milamokaya com
John John		Dilk mk Black com
Jery Mall	1035 S. ARROYO	SERRY STAURO AUL. COM
/19/11 Francis Dogan	480 S. Orange Grove	
Stephany Stamatis	821 N. WILLOX AVE MONTEBELLO, CA 90040	Stepharoonski Chotmail. com
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Tim Harringer	365 Marie Ave, L.	A
HARRY GOPNER		
Lowis Miller	686 Laloma Rd SYPO Pas	rpmillerjr Qaol. com
DAVID DAPPER	SOY ARBOR &	
ROBERT ETTINGER	1617 MAPENGO AVE	

	Avenue mstead.		
	Name	Address	E-mail
	Felix Torres	4127 marmion way	ftopte@ Gradian
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	NAOMI SAIKI-NACIAN	1990 Windergla So. Pas	
	DAMA OSTENSON	555 S.GRAD OSTENSON. BRAN	
	Jack Brickson	1130 Buschfordon C	VOTOSBE GLOBAL - NET
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	Avenue instead.		3
	Name	Address	E-mark
14/1	Dene Baldriep	562 Bellepstanst	- ebalde ste global. We
iont'd	Mary Sohnerder	757 S. ORange Grove	
	LOGAN TAM	283 S. HUDSON AUE	
	Ray ATAR	1610 VISTO DRING	
	BRIAN OFTAL	18449 Buttonwood Ly.	<i>ili</i> -
	RICH JHONG	283 MUDSON PUE	
	DAVID OROZLO	18833 CABRAL ST. L. A	
	ERICK ERLE	COOR STONE VIEW /SIMI	nue
	Anne Homingy	4520 Line Vine Spe	
	TEDDIE HARRINGER	672 STUTE HUEST DE	
	Therese Harringer	2433 Roarcon	
	Joan Wood	30 S. Dange Grow	JERU EMGE CON
	Paty Petano	192 N Saldwin Suna bod	
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	Cardyn Foram	285 W. Calif. Bl.	
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